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Religious Minorities and the First Amendment: The History, the Doctrine, and the
Future

Progressive or liberal constitutional scholars who focus on religious freedom have not
been pleased with the Rehnquist Court.1 For more than a decade, it seems, the Court has been
handing down decisions that have twisted the free exercise and establishment clauses in an
unduly conservative direction. Most notably, Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources v. Smith radically transformed free exercise doctrine,2 while Zelman v. SimmonsHarris,3 the voucher case, consolidated the Court’s recent establishment clause cases into a
modified doctrinal approach. As a consequence, first amendment protections have apparently
shrunken to their smallest since World War II, especially for religious minorities.4
This pessimistic assessment of religion-clause jurisprudence is based on two hypotheses:
first, that the Court for several decades, starting in the 1940s, was particularly receptive to the
1

Jesse H. Choper, The Rise and Decline of the Constitutional Protection of Religious Liberty, 70 Neb. L.
Rev. 651 (1991); Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the Establishment Clause, 90
Cal. L. Rev. 673 (2002); Richard K. Sherwin, Rhetorical Pluralism and the Discourse Ideal: Countering Division
of Employment v. Smith, A Parable of Pagans, Politics, and Majoritarian Rule, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. 388 (1991). For
an attack on the Court’s free exercise jurisprudence from a more conservative political perspective, see Michael W.
McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1109 (1990).
2

494 U.S. 872 (1990).

3

122 S.Ct. 2460 (2002).

4

Justice Breyer writes: “The Court, in effect, turns the clock back. It adopts, under the name of
‘neutrality,’ an interpretation of the Establishment Clause that this Court rejected more than half a century ago.”
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S.Ct. at 2508 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Justice Souter writes:
[T]he reality is that in the matter of educational aid the Establishment Clause has largely been read
away. True, the majority has not approved vouchers for religious schools alone, or aid earmarked
for religious instruction. But no scheme so clumsy will ever get before us, and in the cases that
we may see, like these, the Establishment Clause is largely silenced.
Id. at 2502 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Religious Minorities - 3 religion-clause claims of minorities; and second, that the Rehnquist Court’s doctrinal innovations
will turn subsequent religion-clause cases against minorities in an unprecedented fashion. This
Article challenges both these hypotheses. If the postwar cases are examined from a political,
cultural, and social perspective rather than from a doctrinal one, they reveal a surprising level of
judicial hostility toward religious outsiders. To a great extent, then, the Rehnquist Court merely
has maintained this antagonism and, in all likelihood, will continue to do so in the future. To be
sure, the Rehnquist Court has transformed first amendment doctrine, but these changes are
unlikely to produce results substantially different from prior decisions.5
In making this argument, this Article contributes to an emerging strand of religion-clause
revisionism in legal scholarship. During the post-World War II era, most scholars have
subscribed to a conventional account of the first amendment. This standard story maintains,
first, that the framers laid down a foundational principle of religious freedom, and second, that
the post-World War II Supreme Court—at least before the Rehnquist Court arrived—formulated
doctrine to help fulfill that principle, thus affording great protection to religious outsiders.
Numerous writers would agree with William Lee Miller’s declaration of religious liberty: “We
‘secured’ it—our forefathers did … and on the whole it has stayed secured.”6 The Court itself
has pronounced that the first amendment guarantees “religious liberty and equality to ‘the infidel,
the atheist, or the adherent of a non-Christian faith such as Islam or Judaism.’”7
5

I do not mean to suggest that the Rehnquist Court is not worse than previous Courts for religious
minorities. This Court is worse, but the change is not nearly as pronounced as many assume or argue. The
transition, for religious minorities, is more a matter of degree than of kind.
6

William Lee Miller, The First Liberty: Religion and the American Republic vii (1985). John Noonan
wrote that the first amendment guaranteed “to all a freedom from religious oppression. … Never before 1791 such a
public, almost unalterable commitment to this ideal.” John T. Noonan, Jr., The Lustre of Our Country: The
American Experience of Religious Freedom 2 (1998). Stephen L. Carter applauded the first amendment as “one of
the great gifts that American political philosophy has presented to the world.” Stephen L. Carter, The Culture of
Disbelief 107 (1993). Thomas Curry declared that the first amendment—“the great American experiment”—should
be understood “as a proclamation of principle.” Indeed, the ability of immigrants “to achieve religious liberty,”
Curry wrote, illustrates “how deeply the principle of religious freedom was embedded in American culture and
government.” Thomas J. Curry, Farewell to Christendom 4-5, 58 (2001).
7

County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 590 (1989) (quoting Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52 (1985)).

Religious Minorities - 4 Nonetheless, a revisionist understanding of religious freedom has recently begun to
emerge. 8 According to one strand of this revisionist work, history reveals that, contrary to the
Whiggish conventional account of the religion clauses, the first amendment often has failed to
provide equal liberty for religious minorities.9 A second though related strand of revisionist
work has begun to detail how the meaning and degree of religious freedom has varied through
American history according to contingent political, cultural, and social interests.10 Along these
lines, two important recent articles, one by John Jeffries and James E. Ryan and one by Thomas
C. Berg, explicitly tied the post-World War II development of religious freedom in America to
the evolving political relations between Protestants and Roman Catholics rather than to the
fulfillment of a predetermined constitutional principle.11 Philip Hamburger’s even-more-recent
book, Separation of Church and State, while focused on the importance of Protestant-Catholic

8

Cf., G. Edward White, The Constitution and the New Deal 1-5 (2000) (contrasting conventional and
revisionist accounts of the New Deal-era constitutional revolution).
9

See, e.g., Stephen M. Feldman, A Christian America and the Separation of Church and State, in Law and
Religion: A Critical Anthology 261, 262-66 (Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000) (discussing how the Supreme Court’s
determination of what is religious favors Christianity); Frank S. Ravitch, A Crack in the Wall: Pluralism, Prayer,
and Pain in the Public Schools, in Law and Religion: A Critical Anthology 296, 296-303 (Stephen M. Feldman ed.,
2000) (detailing the discrimination and harassment of religious minorities who object to mainstream religious
practices in the public schools); Samuel J. Levine, Towards a Religious Minority Voice: A Look at Free Exercise
Law Through a Religious Minority Perspective, 5 Wm. & Mary Bill of Rts. J. 153, 160-62 (1996) (arguing that
Supreme Court majorities have failed to accord respect to religious minorities).
10

See, e.g., Stephen M. Feldman, Please Don’t Wish Me a Merry Christmas: A Critical History of the
Separation of Church and State 175-203 (1997) [hereinafter Feldman, Please Don’t] (discussing the development of
a concept of separation of church and state both before and after the framing); Philip Hamburger, Separation of
Church and State (2002) (focusing on Protestant-Catholic relations in the nineteenth century to trace the
transformation of religious liberty into a separation principle); Thomas C. Berg, Anti-Catholicism and Modern
Church-State Relations, 33 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 121, 123-51 (2001) (discussing the importance of Protestant-Catholic
relations to the separation of church and state during the 1940s to the early 1960s); John C. Jeffries & James E.
Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 279, 297-305 (2001) (detailing ProtestantCatholic disputes regarding education during nineteenth century); see also Frederick M. Gedicks, The Rhetoric of
Church and State: A Critical Analysis of Religion Clause Jurisprudence (1995) (arguing that different communities
generate different discourses that describe the relationship between church and state in distinctive and sometimes
incompatible ways).
11

Berg, supra note 10; Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 10.

Religious Minorities - 5 relations for the nineteenth-century development of religious liberty, largely agrees with
Jeffries’s, Ryan’s, and Berg’s views on the post-World War II period.12
Revisionist and conventional scholars agree, though, on at least one important point.
Before the post-World War II era, the religion clauses were almost toothless in the United States
Supreme Court.13 Few cases made their way to the Court, and in those few cases, the Court
typically upheld the governmental actions, whether challenged under either the establishment or
free exercise clause.14 During and after the war, however, the Court transformed its religionclause jurisprudence. In the 1940s, the Court incorporated both religion clauses to apply against
state and local actions through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.15
Consequently, many more governmental actions were subject to constitutional attack and an
increasing number of cases reached the Court. Equally important, the Court became more
receptive to these new religion-clause claims, occasionally striking down the challenged
governmental actions.16
From a revisionist standpoint, this jurisprudential transformation presents an interesting
twofold problem: how precisely did the Court’s approach to these religion-clause cases change,

12

Hamburger, supra note 10, at 450-63.

13

For example, Jesse H. Choper writes:

[B]efore the middle of this century, these provisions of the Bill of Rights applied only to the
federal government; since the states enacted most legislation, and Congress was quite inactive in
regulating domestic affairs, there simply was not much occasion for the Supreme Court to
interpret the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. Where they were in issue, the Court
afforded them a relatively restricted meaning.
Jesse H. Choper, A Century of Religious Freedom, 88 Calif. L. Rev. 1709, 1712 (2000).
14

E.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (upholding governmental proscription of Mormon
practice of polygamy); see Carl H. Esbeck, Table of United States Supreme Court Decisions Relating to Religious
Liberty 1789-1994, 10 J.L. & Religion 573 (1993-1994) (summarizing cases).
15

Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (incorporating establishment clause); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (incorporating free exercise clause).
16

For a brief summary of the cases, see Esbeck, supra note 14.

Religious Minorities - 6 and what factors contributed to those changes? The Jeffries and Ryan article, in conjunction
with the Berg article, uncovers a significant part of this story. If one adds together all the sundry
Protestant denominations and sects, Protestants always have constituted the largest proportion of
the American population. During the first 150 years of the nation’s history, America was, to a
great extent, “de facto” Protestant.17 Freedom of conscience, or the free exercise of religion, was
based directly on Protestant doctrine, while official disestablishment arose primarily because of
competition among a multitude of Protestant groups.18 Put in different words, religious freedom

17

Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Garden and the Wilderness 11 (1965). Some commentators argue that, due to
demographic changes, there was a second disestablishment—a disestablishment of the nation’s unofficial or de facto
Protestantism that was complete by the end of the 1930s. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights
and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 Va. L. Rev. 1, 15 (1996).
18

Feldman, Please Don’t, supra note 10, at 145-217. The connection between freedom of conscience and
Protestant doctrine (and experience) was suggested in the 1824 decision, Updegraph v. Commonwealth, in which the
court approved a blasphemy statute: “This act, was not passed, as the counsel supposed, when religious and civil
tyranny were at their height; but on the breaking forth of the sun of religious liberty, by those who had suffered
much for conscience' sake, and fled from ecclesiastical oppression.” Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 Serg. &
Rawle 394 (Pa. 1824), reprinted in 5 The Founders’ Constitution 170, 174 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds.,
1987). Noah Feldman, however, has recently argued that both free exercise and disestablishment in the first
amendment were intellectually grounded on a principled commitment to liberty of conscience. Noah Feldman, The
Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 346 (2002).
Helpful historical discussions, related to the development of religious freedom, include the following:
Sydney E. Ahlstrom, A Religious History of the American People (1972); Morton Borden, Jews, Turks, and Infidels
(1984); Jon Butler, Awash in a Sea of Faith: Christianizing the American People (1990); Naomi W. Cohen, Jews in
Christian America: The Pursuit of Religious Equality (1992); Thomas J. Curry, The First Freedoms: Church and
State in America to the Passage of the First Amendment (1986); Feldman, Please Don’t, supra note 10; Robert T.
Handy, A Christian America (2d ed. 1984); Nathan O. Hatch, The Democratization of American Christianity (1989);
Winthrop S. Hudson & John Corrigan, Religion in America (5th ed. 1992); Gregg Ivers, To Build a Wall: American
Jews and the Separation of Church and State (1995); Frederic Cople Jaher, A Scapegoat in the New Wilderness:
The Origins and Rise of Anti-Semitism in America (1994); Leonard W. Levy, The Establishment Clause: Religion
and the First Amendment (1986); Martin E. Marty, Protestantism in the United States: Righteous Empire (2d ed.
1986); Eric M. Mazur, The Americanization of Religious Minorities: Confronting the Constitutional Order (1999);
Peter Novick, The Holocaust in American Life (1999); Leo Pfeffer, Church, State, and Freedom (1953); Anson
Phelps Stokes, 1 Church and State in the United States (1950); Robert Wuthnow, The Restructuring of American
Religion (1988); Harold J. Berman, Religion and Law: The First Amendment in Historical Perspective, 35 Emory
L.J. 777 (1986); Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the Nonestablishment
Principle, 27 Ariz. St. L.J. 1085 (1995); Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause: Religious
Exemptions Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1106 (1994); Church and State in American
History (John F. Wilson & Donald L. Drakeman eds., 2d ed. 1987); The Supreme Court in Conference (1940-1985):
The Private Discussions Behind Nearly 300 Supreme Court Decisions (Del Dickson ed., 2001) [hereinafter In
Conference].

Religious Minorities - 7 under the first amendment emerged initially from and was largely understood as consistent with
the mainstream Protestant values and interests.
Yet, starting in the mid-nineteenth century, immigration helped produce an everexpanding American Catholic community.19 From 1850 to 1900, the Catholic population grew
from 1.7 million to 12 million, and by 1930, that number had doubled.20 As early as 1920, one in
six Americans and one in three church members were Catholic. If measured against the
respective Protestant denominations and sects, Catholics had become by the 1950s the largest
Christian group in America: while the total number of Protestants still far outnumbered
Catholics, Catholics nonetheless exceeded the largest Protestant denomination, the Baptists, by
almost two to one. Throughout the rest of the century, the relative proportion of Protestants and
Catholics would remain roughly unchanged.21 The presence of such a large Catholic community
in America had serious repercussions, generally increasing Catholic political power and, at
different times, generating Protestant backlashes. Jeffries, Ryan, and Berg specifically explore
how these factors influenced the development of the concept of religious freedom during the
postwar era.22

19

Hamburger stresses the degree to which a significant aspect of the nineteenth-century Protestant values
and interests was wound up with anti-Catholicism. Furthermore, he argues that this factor helped transform
religious liberty into the separation of church and state. Hamburger, supra note 10, at 109-284.
20

Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 10, at 306; Klarman, supra note 17, at 49.

21

In the 1990s, nine out of ten Americans claimed a specific religious affiliation, with 86.5 percent of them
being Christians. Of those Christians, Protestants outnumbered Catholics approximately two to one, but Catholics
were the largest Christian group, at 28 percent of the population, with Baptists second. Less than two percent of the
American population is Jewish and only 0.5 percent is Muslim. Ahlstrom, supra note 18, at 1002; Hudson &
Corrigan, supra note 18, at 241, 340-41 & n.35, 425; Marty, supra note 18, at 3, 208; U.S. Census Bureau,
Statistical Abstract of the United States, Tables No. 74-75, at 61-62 (2000).
22

Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 10; Berg, supra note 10; see Hamburger, supra note 10, at 450-63
(discussing post-World War II anti-Catholicism). Douglas Laycock previously had mentioned a link between antiCatholicism and the justices’ attitudes toward religious freedom. Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of
Separation and Neutrality, 46 Emory L.J. 43, 57-58 (1997). Laycock, in turn, had relied on John T. McGreevy,
Thinking on One's Own: Catholicism in the American Intellectual Imagination, 1928-1960, 84 J. Am. Hist. 97
(1997).

Religious Minorities - 8 Despite the importance of their work, though, Jeffries, Ryan, and Berg overlook a crucial
point. The true measure of a nation’s commitment to religious freedom, it would seem, lay in its
treatment of religious minorities or outgroups. Given the superior size of the American Catholic
population vis-à-vis even the largest Protestant denominations and sects—Catholics now
constitute 28 percent of the total population and outnumber Southern Baptists by a whopping 46
million23—a history of religious freedom in America that focuses solely on Catholic-Protestant
relations is likely to miss an important part of the story. For that reason, while this Article
discusses Catholic-Protestant connections, it primarily explores cases involving American Jews,
who have always remained a numerically small religious minority, regardless of their various
social and political successes (and failures) in this country. In the words of William Lee Miller,
“the prime test would be, how was it for the Jews?”24
Part I examines two factors that contributed to the Court’s changing approach to religious
freedom during and after World War II: first, the increasingly powerful American Catholic
community, and second, a transformation within the American Jewish community.25 Part II
focuses on how religious outsiders, chiefly American Jews, argued religion-clause claims before
the Supreme Court during the postwar era, and how the Court responded to the different types of
arguments in its decisions.26 When, on the one hand, Jews and other non-Christians asked the
Court to create an apparent exception to the mainstream understanding of religion and religious
freedom by invoking the free exercise clause, then the Court denied their claims. When, on the
23

U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States, Tables No. 74-75, at 61-62 (2000).

24

Miller, supra note 6, at 194. Berg barely mentions the role of American Jews, Berg, supra note 10, at
149, while Jeffries and Ryan accord the topic only slightly more attention. Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 10, at 129.
Hamburger does devote some minimal attention to Jews, but given his near-500 page text, his devotion of part of
one section, amounting to six pages, together with a few additional brief references, has to be considered scant and
insufficient. Hamburger, supra note 10, at 391-96. To be fair to Berg, Jeffries, Ryan, and Hamburger, though, their
focus was on Protestant-Catholic relations rather than on Christian-Jewish relations. But again, that disregard of
Jews and antisemitism is one important reason for writing this Article.
25

See infra text accompanying notes _-_.

26

See infra text accompanying notes _-_.

Religious Minorities - 9 other hand, Jews instead urged the Court to stretch the shield of the establishment clause so that
they too might have refuge, they occasionally were successful. Religious freedom thus has
developed from its initial Protestant origins and understanding so that it now extends at least
some meaningful protection to Jews and other religious outsiders.27
Part III of the Article looks to the future. It begins by tracing the Rehnquist Court's
recent doctrinal changes in establishment and free exercise cases and explains how those changes
appear to favor mainstream religions while harming religious outsiders.28 Part III then
recommends several possible doctrinal innovations that might bolster first amendment
27

Cf., Derrick A. Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 Harv. L.
Rev. 518 (1980) (arguing that African Americans historically have gained social justice only when their interests
happened to converge with the interests of the white majority). The question of who constitutes a religious outsider
is, of course, subject to sharp dispute. For purposes of this Article, I do not need to give one precise and static
definition of religious outsiders. In the course of the discussion, I identify which specific religious groups I am
discussing when it is relevant. Most often, I intend the term, religious outsiders, to denote non-Christians.
Generally, I follow the political scientist James C. Brent who distinguishes mainstream from non-mainstream
religions. To Brent, any non-Christian religion is non-mainstream in America. Most Christian religions are
mainstream, though some of the minority Christian groups, such as the Seventh-Day Adventists and the Jehovah’s
Witnesses, are deemed non-mainstream. James C. Brent, An Agent and Two Principals: U.S. Court of Appeals
Responses to Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith and the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 27 Am. Pol. Q. 236, 259 (1999); cf. Frank Way & Barbara J. Burt, Religious Marginality and the
Free Exercise Clause, 77 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 652, 654 & n.7 (1983) (distinguishing mainline from marginal
religions).
Although I emphasize constitutional development (or judicial transformation) in this Article, I do not mean
to preclude the possibility that America can experience constitutional revolutions, as suggested by Bruce Ackerman.
Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (1991). In the realm of the history of American jurisprudence, I
have suggested that neither evolution nor revolution precisely captures the nature of change:
[A] broad idea, X, might tend to develop into another idea, Y, but this development might not
emerge unless and until particular social, political, and cultural circumstances arise that facilitate
or trigger it. As a general matter, the elements for a major intellectual change--say, from X to Y-often seem to gather over an extended time period, like clouds on the horizon, but the transition
remains latent, as a mere potential, until a large social disturbance such as a Civil or World War
occurs. This social upheaval then precipitates the intellectual transformation, like a sudden burst
of rain. Of course, as described, the intellectual transformation is neither exactly sudden nor
exactly gradual--neither revolutionary nor evolutionary. Despite final appearances, the intellectual
transition should not be understood as an unexpected or unpredictable cloudburst because it has
been building for years and sometimes even decades. Yet, even so, it is not truly gradual, steady,
and slow because the transition does not emerge in a clearly recognizable form until the requisite
social event finally triggers the ultimate transformation.
Stephen M.Feldman, American Legal Thought From Premodernism to Postmodernism: An Intellectual
Voyage 5-6 (2000).
28
See infra text accompanying notes _-_.

Religious Minorities - 10 protections for religious outsiders.29 Part III next discusses the probability that these
recommended changes would prove fruitful.30 Drawing from history, as detailed in Parts I and
II, the unfortunate reality is that the Court is unlikely to adopt these recommendations, regardless
of their virtues. Part III concludes, however, by explaining that the Court’s own recent doctrinal
changes, when understood in light of the history of religion-clause cases, will not turn future first
amendment cases in a drastically more conservative direction.31
29

See infra text accompanying notes _-_.

30

See infra text accompanying notes _-_.

31

Apart from the revisionist scholarship specifically focusing on religious freedom, my argument builds on
three emerging and interrelated lines of thought from political science and constitutional scholarship. First, in his
landmark 1997 book, Civic Ideals, Rogers M. Smith articulated a “multiple traditions thesis [which] holds that
American political actors have always promoted civic ideologies that blend liberal, democratic republican, and
inegalitarian ascriptive elements in various combinations.” Rogers M. Smith, Civic Ideals 6 (1997). In this Article,
I elaborate the inegalitarian ascriptive element of the American understanding of religious freedom—an element of
our constitutionalism that most often is obscured, denied, or ignored. Second, I follow scholars such as Robert A.
Dahl and Michael J. Klarman who have argued that, as a general matter, the Supreme Court does not heroically
protect outsiders from majoritarian overreaching. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme
Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. Pub. L. 279, 293-94 (1957); Klarman, supra note 17, at 1-7; see Barry
Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 333 (1998) (questioning the existence of a countermajoritarian difficulty). Rather, the Court tends to
be a part of and to support, in Dahl’s words, “the dominant national alliance.” Dahl, supra, at 293. While the Court,
to a degree, might be politically insulated, it certainly is not politically isolated. Finally, I follow scholars such as
Klarman, Stephen M. Griffin, Barry Friedman, and Scott B. Smith in seeking to understand American
constitutionalism from a historical perspective that accounts for all of American history, not just the framing; this
approach resonates with the historical new institutionalism that is blossoming in political science. Barry Friedman
& Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 5-6 (1998); Stephen M. Griffin,
Constitutional Theory Transformed, 108 Yale L.J. 2115 (1999); Klarman, supra note 17, at 1-7. Friedman and
Smith write: “[H]istory is essential to interpretation of the Constitution, but the relevant history is not just that of the
Founding, it is that of all American constitutional history.” Friedman & Smith, supra, at 6-7. Griffin writes:
[A]ll the theories of constitutional interpretation normally discussed by scholars accept an
ahistorical view about the role that the constitutional principles of the early republic can and
should play in the complex democracy of the present. The emphasis in these theories—
characteristic of American constitutionalism from the beginning—is on how the fundamental
principles adopted by the Founding generation can solve contemporary constitutional problems.
This approach is completely implausible from an historicist perspective.
Griffin, supra, at 2120. Elsewhere, Griffin explains that “[c]onstitutionalism should be appreciated as a dynamic
political and historical process rather than as a static body of thought laid down in the eighteenth century.” Stephen
M. Griffin, American Constitutionalism: From Theory to Politics 5 (1996).
In political science, new institutionalists explain how Supreme Court justices are influenced by both their
political preferences and the structural or institutional mechanisms in which they operate (as justices). For a helpful
explanation of the new institutionalism, see Keith E. Whittington, Once More Unto the Breach: Postbehavioralist

Religious Minorities - 11 Part IV is a brief Conclusion. To clarify at the outset, I use the term religious freedom in
this Article in a conventional sense: as referring to the relationship between religion and
government, or to what is commonly called the separation of church and state. Religious
freedom, in other words, is a constitutional guarantee that encompasses issues that fall ordinarily
under either the free exercise clause, the establishment clause, or both.32
I. Causes of Change
A. Catholic-Protestant Relations
The enhanced American Catholic population strongly contributed to the Court’s
increased receptiveness toward religious-freedom cases during and after World War II. In some
parts of the country, the political ramifications of the growing Catholic community became
apparent as early as the nineteenth century. By the 1880s, Catholic mayors had been elected in
several Northeastern cities, including New York and Boston.33 During Prohibition in the 1920s,
Catholics did not need to seek judicial intervention to protect their sacramental use of wine
because Congress readily created a legislative exception for such use.34 The expanding Catholic
Approaches to Judicial Politics, 25 Law & Soc. Inquiry 601 (2000) (reviewing Supreme Court Decision-Making:
New Institutionalist Approaches (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman, eds., 1999); The Supreme Court in
American Politics: New Institutionalist Interpretations (Howard Gillman & Cornell Clayton, eds., 1999)). Rogers
M. Smith is an example of a historical new institutionalist. Smith, supra, at 6, 509-10.
Thus, I agree with G. Edward White’s and Barry Cushman’s view that Supreme Court decision making is
not pure politics. Instead, Supreme Court justices find legal consciousness to be a real constraint on their decisions.
White, supra note 8, at 1-32; Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court, 80 Va. L. Rev. 201 (1994). Indeed,
part of what I write about in this Article is the shaping or construction of legal consciousness, specifically the law
related to the establishment and free exercise clauses. Needless to say, though, I believe that cultural, societal, and
political interests strongly influence such legal developments.
32

For instance, Erwin Chemerinsky writes: “To a large extent, the establishment and free exercise clauses
are complementary. Both protect freedom of religious belief and actions.” Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional
Law: Principles and Policies 1140 (2d ed. 2002). Laurence H. Tribe writes similarly: “The constitutional concepts
of religious autonomy were first articulated in the religion clauses of the first amendment, assuring both free
exercise and nonestablishment.” Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1154 (2d ed. 1988). Many
commentators have noted that, while the free exercise and establishment clauses are interrelated, there also is a
tension between the two. Chemerinsky, supra, at 1140-41; Tribe, supra, at 1154.
33
34

Klarman, supra note 17, at 52.

Volstead Act of Oct. 28, 1919, 41 Stat. 305, codified at 27 USC § 16, repealed by Act of Aug. 27, 1935,
49 Stat 872; see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 195, 216 (1992) (noting

Religious Minorities - 12 political power, furthermore, affected attitudes toward the separation of church and state.
Specifically, Catholic and Protestant attitudes had traditionally diverged on church-state issues:
Protestants tended to favor religious (predominantly Protestant) practices in the public schools
but opposed governmental aid to nonpublic (predominantly Catholic) schools, while Catholics
tended to hold the opposite viewpoints. Protestant political power long had allowed them to
impose their preferences, but during the 1920s and 1930s, Catholic political power in a number
of states had grown sufficient “to secure enactment of laws subsidizing parochial schools with
publicly-funded textbooks and bus transportation.”35 Moreover, at least some state courts in
heavily Catholic states, such as Wisconsin and Illinois, became receptive to Catholic challenges
to Bible reading and religious displays in the public schools.36
Needless to say, though, many Protestants did not meekly accept enhanced Catholic
political power and assertiveness.37 In the late 1940s, for instance, several mainstream Protestant
denominations joined to form Protestants and Other Americans United for the Separation of
Church and State, which was vociferously anti-Catholic and strongly opposed public aid for
parochial schools.38 Indeed, most important, the Supreme Court’s judicial enforcement of
that mainstream Christian groups, such as the Roman Catholics during Prohibition, generally do not need to seek
free exercise exemptions in the courts).
35

Klarman, supra note 17, at 53.

36

Id. at 49-50. Jeffries and Ryan write:

As early as 1869, the school board in Cincinnati, then one of the most religiously heterogeneous of
American cities, voted to ban Bible reading, hymns, and religious instruction in the public schools.
The resulting firestorm of protest prompted litigation all the way to the Ohio Supreme Court,
which eventually ruled that the school board was permitted to omit religious instruction if it
wished. Some urban centers with large Catholic populations followed suit. In the 1870s, New
York City, Chicago, Buffalo, and Rochester banned Bible reading in the public schools. Indeed,
by the early twentieth century, a few state courts had outlawed Bible reading and other religious
observances in public school as violative of state constitutions, though most courts continued to
approve these practices.
Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 10, at 304.
37

See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 10, at 313 (discussing postwar Protestant opposition to Catholics).

38

Ivers, supra note 18, at 25-26.

Religious Minorities - 13 religious freedom after World War II can be understood, in part, as a Protestant reaction to the
perceived Catholic threat within the American democracy.39 The Supreme Court always
remained overwhelmingly Protestant; from the 1940s through the 1970s, no more than one
Catholic and one Jew ever sat on the Court at any time.40 Insofar as Catholic and Protestant
values and practices diverged, the separation of church and state became partly a mechanism that
Protestants could invoke to prevent or retard the imposition of Catholic views. Unsurprisingly,
then, in cases challenging governmental aid to nonpublic schools, which are overwhelmingly
Catholic, the Supreme Court has struck down the governmental action as unconstitutional nearly
twice as often as it has upheld the action.41 According to Jeffries and Ryan:
39

Cf. Wuthnow, supra note 18, at 72-74 (discussing Protestant perceptions of a Roman Catholic threat).
Berg writes that, during the post-World War II years, “the alleged political power and danger of the Catholic Church
was the most prominent issue in America concerning religion and public life.” Berg, supra note 10, at 124; see id. at
129 (detailing documented anti-Catholic sentiments of Supreme Court justices).
40

Through 1990, 91 of 104 Supreme Court justices came from Protestant backgrounds. Eight justices were
Roman Catholic: Roger Taney (appointed in 1835), Edward D. White (1894), Joseph McKenna (1897), Pierce
Butler (1922), Frank Murphy (1939), William Brennan (1956), Antonin Scalia (1986), and Anthony Kennedy
(1987). Five justices were Jewish: Louis Brandeis (1916), Benjamin Cardozo (1932), Felix Frankfurter (1939),
Arthur Goldberg (1962), and Abe Fortas (1965). See Congressional Quarterly, Guide to the U.S. Supreme Court
794 (2d ed. 1990). James F. Byrnes, who served as an associate justice for only the 1941-1942 term, was born into a
Roman Catholic family, but converted to Episcopalianism when he married in 1906. More recently, two more
Jewish justices have been appointed: Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Steven G. Breyer. Clarence Thomas was born a
Baptist, raised a Catholic, began attending an Episcopal Church, and most recently, returned to Catholicism. In fact,
if Thomas is categorized as Catholic, then 1996 marked the first time that a majority of the justices were not
Protestant. Mazur, supra note 18, at 12, 179 n.3; see The Supreme Court Justices: Illustrated Biographies, 17891993, at 530 (Clare Cushman ed., 1993) (detailing Thomas’s religious background through 1993).
41

See Geoffrey R. Stone, Louis M. Seidman, Cass R. Sunstein, & Mark V. Tushnet, Constitutional Law
1494-1503 (2d ed. 1991) (listing cases); Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 115, 134 (1992) (characterizing Warren Court as deeply suspicious of Catholicism). Laurence Tribe argues
that this pattern is based on a consistent application of coherent constitutional considerations. Laurence H. Tribe,
American Constitutional Law 1219-21 (2d ed. 1988). Jeffries and Ryan write:
The Supreme Court's first concern during this period (1947-1996) was to inhibit aid to parochial
schools. In thirteen cases, the Court considered various programs that would have eased the
financial burden on parents who sent their children to church schools. The Court allowed
reimbursement of transportation expenses, loan of approved textbooks, reimbursement for the
costs of state-mandated testing and record-keeping, state income tax deductions for private-school
expenses, and provision of a sign-language interpreter for a disabled child in parochial school.
None of these programs offered much more than incidental support to church schools. Perhaps for
that reason, they survived Supreme Court scrutiny, but just barely. Only the textbook loan
program had a vote to spare; the others, like Everson, divided five-four. More often, the Court
struck down attempts to help church schools. Specifically, the Court prohibited state supplements

Religious Minorities - 14 [A] ban against aid to religious schools was supported by the great bulk of the
Protestant faithful. With few exceptions, Protestant denominations, churches, and
believers vigorously opposed aid to religious schools. For many Protestant
denominations, this position followed naturally from the circumstances of their
founding. It was strongly reinforced, however, by hostility to Roman Catholics
and the challenge they posed to the Protestant hegemony, which prevailed
throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In its political origins
and constituencies, the ban against aid to religious schools aimed not only to
prevent an establishment of religion but also to maintain one.42
The Supreme Court’s protection, whether conscious or unconscious, of Protestant
interests and values vis-à-vis Catholics also can help explain first amendment cases involving
religious displays and practices in the public schools. As Catholic political power grew through
the twentieth century, Catholics tended to become more confident of their strength and position
in America and thus, particularly after World War II, began to increase their support for public
school religious displays. Put simply, as Catholics gained more political control over the public
schools, they were more willing to have religion in the schools.43 One does not have to be overly
for the salaries of nonpublic school teachers, tuition reimbursement, maintenance and repair of
schools serving low-income students, reimbursement for expenses of state-mandated and
nonmandated testing, provision of school services and educational equipment, aid for instructional
materials and field trips, and loan of public-school teachers to teach secular subjects in parochial
schools (twice).
Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 10, at 288-89 (footnotes omitted).
42

Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 10, at 282.
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See Morgan, supra note 18, at 81-90, 124-25 (on emergence of Catholic community after World War II
and growing Catholic support for religious displays); Berg, supra note 10, at 126-27 (explaining shifting Catholic
and Protestant attitudes toward religion in the public schools); Klarman, supra note 17, at 57, 60 (on Catholic
support for public school religious displays). Jeffries and Ryan write:
Historically, religious observances in public schools had been distinctly Protestant, and Catholics
objected to them on that ground. In the 1940s, the church changed its mind and began to call for
religious content in public education. The switch sprang in part from the elimination of Protestant
specificity in religious exercises and in part from growing confidence that Catholic students would
not be “lost to the fold” if they said ecumenical prayer. Partly, however, the change in position

Religious Minorities - 15 cynical to recognize that the Supreme Court began to question the constitutionality of these
public school religious displays and practices only in this postwar political context. In response
to the changing Catholic attitudes concerning religion in the public schools, many Protestants—
not only Supreme Court justices—became more wary of public school religious practices and
displays for at least two reasons. First, anti-Catholic Protestants would resist any Catholic
exertion of power in the public schools, and second, Protestants were increasingly attracted to the
idea of a principled strict separation of church and state to be used as a bulwark against Catholic
power, particularly in the face of Catholic efforts to gain public support for parochial schools.44
Unsurprisingly, then, some justices occasionally revealed their Protestant biases in
private communications. For instance, at a November 1946 oral argument, Justice William O.
Douglas passed a note to Justice Hugo Black stating that “[i]f the Catholics get public money to
finance their religious schools, we better insist on getting some good prayers in public schools or

was strategic. Catholic leaders began highlighting the secularization of public education in order
to bolster the case for church schools. If public schools could be portrayed as hostile to the
devout, the argument for funding religious education would be strengthened. This strategic
motivation was not lost on commentators at the time: an editorial in the New York Post, for
example, suggested that Cardinal Spellman's denunciation of Engel was prompted “not by the
prohibition of a prayer which many churchmen would agree has little religious value, but by the
potential impact of the decision on the aid-to-education battle.” That Catholic leaders actually
cared more about funding Catholic schools than they did about keeping religion in the public
schools became even more apparent when Catholic leaders either remained neutral or testified
against constitutional amendments to validate school prayer.
Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 10, at 323-24.
44

For a discussion of the Protestant leaders’ strong support in favor of the Supreme Court’s decisions
banning Bible reading in the public schools, see Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 10, at 320. Berg writes:
[T]he school aid debate often seemed to drive people's attitudes on other church-state matters. For
example, The Christian Century, the leading mainline Protestant magazine, reasoned that the
Catholic Church would use any method “to blur the principle of separation of church and state,”
and therefore it was necessary for Americans to “reinforce” the principle, even to the point of
doing away with government-paid chaplains for military servicemen and the inclusion of churches
among tax-exempt organizations. The magazine acknowledged that such programs were
sympathetic in themselves, but argued that they set dangerous precedents for parochial school aid.
Berg, supra note 10, at 126.

Religious Minorities - 16 we Protestants are out of business.”45 After that same oral argument, Justice Wiley B. Rutledge
fretted that the case was “really a fight by the Catholic schools to secure this money from the
public treasury. It is aggressive and on a wide scale. There is probably no other group which is
either persistent in efforts to secure this type of legislation or insistent upon it.”46 In a case
argued the following term, Justice Robert Jackson asserted at the post-oral argument conference
that “[t]his cuts the Protestants out of the schools at the same time that we are paying for
Catholic schools’ buses. Protestants don’t have a good means of standing out.”47 To be sure, the
justices generally avoided in their public statements such obvious expressions of pro-Protestant
and anti-Catholic attitudes, thou occasionally they would reveal a similar albeit less overt bias.48
In their judicial opinions, however, the justices most often explained their religion-clause
decisions with ringing declarations of principle.
Without doubt, the significance of the Protestant-Catholic division for understanding the
judicial enforcement of religious freedom should not be overstated. Positions on issues of
church and state did not (and still do not) neatly divide with Protestants on one side of the line
and Catholics on the other.49 Nonetheless, the fact remains: the Supreme Court began to enforce
the religion clauses with vigor only when Catholics became more politically potent. Given the
strong Protestant sentiments against Catholicism expressed so often throughout American
history, the concurrence of these judicial and social developments does not seem merely
coincidental. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, the causal connection between the shifting
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In Conference, supra note 18, at 401 n.26 (discussing Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947)).
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McGreevy, supra note 22, at 123-24 (quoting Rutledge’s Memo after Conference).
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In Conference, supra note 18, at 404 (discussing McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948)).
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See Berg, supra note 10, at 129 (detailing documented anti-Catholic sentiments of Supreme Court
justices); McGreevy, supra note 22, at 121-26 (same).
49

Cohen, supra note 18, at 129, 138-39, 222; Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 230, 231 (1994); cf. Wuthnow, supra note 18, at 73 (many court cases found Protestants and
Catholics on different sides of the fence).

Religious Minorities - 17 Protestant-Catholic relations and the Court’s interpretation of religious freedom after World War
II is the central unifying theme of both the Jeffries and Ryan article and the Berg article. “The
widespread distrust of Catholicism was almost certainly a factor,” Berg writes, “in how the
justices of the Supreme Court decided the first modern Establishment Clause cases.”50
B. The American Jewish Community
A second factor contributing to the Court’s increasing solicitude for first amendment
claims during the postwar era was a change in American Jewish attitudes and conduct.
Throughout most of the nineteenth century, Jews were an exceedingly small minority in this
country: numbering approximately 4,500 in 1830; 40,000 in 1845; and still only 150,000 by the
Civil War.51 Starting in the 1880s, though, Eastern European Jews began streaming into the
United States. Between 1887 and 1927, the total number of American Jews increased from
229,000 to over 4,228,000. Nonetheless, the American Jewish community never amounted
overall to more than a small numerical minority, even at its peak constituting only about three
percent of the total American population.52
Furthermore, overt antisemitism was common and socially accepted in most quarters of
American society, at least through World War II.53 A few brief examples will suffice.
Throughout the 1920s, Henry Ford published a newspaper, The Dearborn Independent, that
incessantly attacked Jews with traditional antisemitic diatribes, claiming Jews controlled
American banking, American agriculture, American journalism, and so on. Many Americans
must have agreed with Ford, since The Dearborn Independent increased circulation almost
tenfold within four years to 700,000 copies per week, only 50,000 less than the best-selling paper

50

Berg, supra note 10, at 127; see Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 10, at 280 (emphasizing the usefulness of a
political view of establishment clause cases).
51

Leonard Dinnerstein, Antisemitism in America 24 (1994).

52

Howard M. Sachar, A History of the Jews in America 116-17 (1992); Klarman, supra note 17, at 49.

53

Dinnerstein, supra note 51, at 58-149.

Religious Minorities - 18 in the country.54 The Secretary of the Chamber of Commerce in St. Petersburg, Florida,
apparently was one who shared Ford’s sentiments, as he “advocated expelling all Jews and
foreigners” from the city in 1924.55 In the spring of 1936, eight Harvard Law Review editors
had not been offered a job for the following year; all were Jewish.56 Throughout the 1930s, Jews
who fled Germany believed that antisemitism was worse in the United States than in pre-Nazi
Germany.57 In a 1944 poll, twenty-four percent of Americans identified Jews as the single
national, religious, or racial group that presented the greatest menace or threat to Americans (as a
comparison, nine percent identified Japanese, and six percent chose Germans—even though the
poll was conducted well before the end of the war).58 Given such widespread antisemitic
sentiments, Jews tended to avoid asserting their rights and interests either in litigation or even in
political electioneering. Up through the early decades of the twentieth century, “[a]ssimilation,
not ethnocentric demands for equal rights, [was] the operative norm among the American Jewish
leadership.”59 Jews hoped that the non-confrontational education of non-Jews might eventually
diminish antisemitic behavior and attitudes.60 To assert legal rights more directly and
energetically, it was feared, would likely have been counter-productive, engendering reactionary
reprisals.61
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Id. at 78.
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Jerold S. Auerbach, Unequal Justice: Lawyers and Social Change in Modern America 186 (1976).
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Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social
Research, 1923-1950, at 34 (1973); Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma 53, 1186 n.4 (1944).
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Dinnerstein, supra note 51, at 131.
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Ivers, supra note 18, at 32.
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Id. at 34-65.
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See Dinnerstein, supra note 51, at 13-57 (discussing antisemitism in nineteenth-century America); Jaher,
supra note 18, at 114-241 (same).

Religious Minorities - 19 After World War II, though, Jews and Jewish organizations–especially the American
Jewish Committee (AJCommittee), the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), and the American
Jewish Congress (AJCongress)–stepped forward to press for religious freedom and equality in
the courts. These organizations were buoyed by a reduction of overt antisemitism in America
and spurred by a post-Holocaust sense of urgency.62 The Holocaust painfully demonstrated to
American Jews “the consequences that communal silence had wrought for European Jewry.”63 I
do not mean to suggest that American Jews dwelled on the Holocaust and its meaning for them.
Instead, they tended to downplay the Nazis’ obsessive destruction of European Jews partly
because of the lingering fear of antisemitism in this country. An emphasis on the German
murder of Jews rather than on wider Axis wartime atrocities and totalitarianism in general
seemed ill-advised when West Germany had so quickly become an American ally in the Cold
War battle against the Soviet bloc.64 To harp on the Holocaust during the Cold War era might be
viewed as unpatriotic and rekindle traditional antisemitic accusations of Jewish vengefulness.
Nonetheless, partly because of their awareness of the Holocaust, many American Jews (though
certainly not all) became determined after the war to confront overt antisemitism and Christian
proselytizing. Within the leading Jewish organizations, a more “active, rather than reactive,
domestic program of law and social action” was thus called for.65 Consequently, in a substantial
number of the most important postwar religion-clause cases, the leading Jewish organizations
either instituted the action or participated as amicus curiae.66

62

For a discussion of the reduction in antisemitism after World War II, see Dinnerstein, supra note 51, at
150-74; Novick, supra note 18, at 113.
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Ivers, supra note 18, at 49.
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Novick, supra note 18, at 85-102.
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Ivers, supra note 18, at 49. “The Holocaust brought home … that American Jews could neither achieve
equal civil rights nor ensure the protection of those rights through polite appeals to public opinion.” Id. at 61.
66

For general discussions, see Cohen, supra note 18, at 123-246; Ivers, supra note 18, at 34-188; cf., Robert
F. Drinan, Mending the Wall, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 615 (1986) (discussing Leo Pfeffer).

Religious Minorities - 20 With regard to specific cases, however, unanimity over such tactics rarely existed within
the Jewish community. Disagreements among the various Jewish organizations and among Jews
from different national regions were common. In the words of one AJCommittee and ADL
attorney, Jews in the South could aim for little more than being “accepted as honorary
Protestants.”67 Even so, for the most part, American Jews became more assertive of their rights
to equality and religious freedom during the postwar period. In particular, the AJCongress, with
its General Counsel, Leo Pfeffer, most strongly advocated for the strict separation of church and
state. “[T]he greatest danger,” according to Pfeffer, “[came from] those who plead compromise
for the sake of good interfaith relations and the avoidance of anti-Semitism.”68
II. Supreme Court Cases and Religious Outsiders
The Supreme Court took its first major step toward an increasingly vigorous enforcement
of religious freedom when the Court incorporated the free exercise and establishment clauses
against the states. Earlier in the twentieth century, the Court had begun to hold that the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, adopted during Reconstruction in 1868,
incorporated or implicitly included various provisions of the Bill of Rights. Pursuant to this socalled incorporation doctrine, these constitutional provisions then applied against the state
governments just as they applied against the federal government.69 The Court did not
incorporate the religion clauses, however, until the 1940s. Specifically, under the Court’s
decisions, the free exercise clause was incorporated in 1940, and the establishment clause was
incorporated in 1947.70
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Ivers, supra note 18, at 124.
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Id. at 56 (quoting Leo Pfeffer).
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On the incorporation doctrine in general, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and
Policies 478-86 (2d ed. 2002).
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Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). In
Cantwell, the Court wrote: “The fundamental concept of liberty embodied in [the fourteenth amendment] embraces
the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment.” 310 U.S. at 303.

Religious Minorities - 21 A. Establishment Clause Cases
The first case to incorporate and apply the establishment clause against a state or local
government was Everson v. Board of Education. The case challenged an instance of public aid
to Catholic schools, and as such, it presented the Court with an opportunity to confront the
shifting constellation of Catholic-Protestant relations. Significantly, then, the Court's opinion
reveals the Protestant-tilt of the Court in the face of enhanced Catholic power. Although a bare
five-to-four majority upheld the challenged governmental action, Justice Black’s majority
opinion unequivocally declared a robust antiestablishment principle that could thwart other
attempts to aid parochial schools. In particular, the Court explained the meaning of the religion
clauses, especially the establishment clause, by drawing upon Jefferson’s metaphorical wall of
separation between church and state.
The “establishment of religion” clause of the First Amendment means at least
this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from
church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.
No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or
disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large
or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever
they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in
the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words
of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to
erect “a wall of separation between Church and State.”71
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Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16.

Religious Minorities - 22 Despite then upholding the public reimbursement of transportation costs for children
attending either public or Catholic schools, the Court emphasized that the wall between church
and state “must be kept high and impregnable.”72 As Justice Black said afterward, he had
purposefully tailored the opinion: “I made it as tight and gave them as little room to maneuver as
I could.”73 He considered the decision no more than a “pyrrhic victory” for those who favored
aid to parochial schools (read: Catholics).74 Plus, as Black wrote to one of his former clerks, he
believed the opinion gave “weight to the basically religious nature of Catholic education.”75
The Court for the first time struck down a governmental action as violating the
establishment clause in 1948. 76 The case, McCollum v. Board of Education, involved a
challenge to a released time program in Champaign, Illinois. In this particular program, children
were released early from their public school classes once each week so that they could attend
religious classes, which were held in the public school buildings. Other children, not seeking
religious instruction, were not similarly released from their regular classes. All of the major
Jewish organizations, spurred in part by the Everson Court’s strong language concerning a wall
of separation, joined together in a show of unity to file an amicus brief in the name of the
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Id. at 18.
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Roger K. Newman, Hugo Black: A Biography 363 (2d ed. 1997) (quoting Hugo Black); see Berg, supra
note 10, at 127-28 (discussing Everson).
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Newman, supra note 73, at 364.
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Id. at 682 n.2 (quoting Hugo Black letter to Charles Luce, April 2, 1947). Black's son later commented
that the justice "suspected the Catholic Church." McGreevy, supra note 22, at 124 (quoting Hugo T. Black, My
Father: A Remembrance 104 (1975)). For a discussion of other evidence suggesting that Black retained certain
anti-Catholic sentiments, see Berg, supra note 10, at 129. At the Everson post-oral argument conference, Rutledge
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McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948).

Religious Minorities - 23 Synagogue Council of America (SCA) and the National Community Relations Advisory Council
(NCRAC).77 To underscore the widespread Jewish support for the brief, the SCA and NCRAC’s
Motion for Leave to File Brief as Amici Curiae claimed that they included “in their membership
more than eighty percent of Americans affiliated with Jewish organizations.”78 They, therefore,
professed to “speak for American Jewry.”79
The SCA and NCRAC amicus brief presented a multi-faceted argument, but the main
thrust was straightforward. The released time classes facilitated sectarian religious instruction.
The state participated in such religious instruction in a variety of ways, such as by allowing the
religious instructors to conduct classes in the public school buildings during regular class hours.
This state participation violated the establishment clause.80
More important than the details of this argument, the amicus brief revealed two
interrelated themes or a two-pronged strategy, so to speak, that would persist through many of
the Jewish organizations’ briefs in subsequent post-World War II cases, particularly under the
establishment clause. First, the brief framed its arguments to stress principles, especially
principles of American democracy. By invoking principles rather than specific Jewish interests,
Jews appeared to be joined with rather than separated from other Americans. In fact, still during
the war, Jewish leaders had recognized the importance of stressing the similarities, not the
differences, between Jews and others. In a report on antisemitism, the Executive Vice-President
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Religious Minorities - 24 of the AJCommittee had declared that Jewish organizations “should avoid representing the Jew
as weak, victimized, and suffering. … There needs to be an elimination or at least a reduction of
horror stories of victimized Jewry. … We must normalize the image of the Jew. … The Jew
should be represented as like others, rather than unlike others.”81 Unsurprisingly, then, before
the Jewish organizations even decided to file the McCollum amicus brief, David Petegorsky of
the AJCongress had argued that “Jews have always been, and will always be, far better advised
to take their position on the basis of fundamental principle rather than of temporary or immediate
considerations of expediency.”82
The brief itself began by emphasizing this theme:
We regard the principle of separation of church and state as one of the
foundations of American democracy. Both political liberty and freedom of
religious worship and belief, we are firmly convinced, can remain inviolate only
when there exists no intrusion of secular authority in religious affairs or of
religious authority in secular affairs. As Americans and as spokesmen for
religious bodies, lay and clerical, we therefore deem any breach in the wall
separating church and state as jeopardizing the political and religious freedoms
that wall was intended to protect.83
Given the Jewish organizations’ desire to invoke principles, the Protestant-tinged
protectionism that had emerged in the Everson opinion proved fortuitous. When Justice Black
had articulated the wall-of-separation principle, he aimed in part to fortify Protestant
prerogatives against potential Catholic incursions. The plight and interests of Jews and other
81
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Brief of Synagogue Council of America and National Community Relations Advisory Council as Amici
Curiae, McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (October Term 1947, No. 90), at 1-2.

Religious Minorities - 25 non-Christian outsiders probably did not sway his reasoning.84 Yet, in McCollum and
subsequent cases, the Jewish organizations seized upon Black’s language and invoked it to their
advantage. Indeed, the very beginning of the argument section of the McCollum amicus brief
quoted from Everson on the principled wall of separation.85
Moreover, to accentuate the focus on principle rather than on Jewish interests, the brief
took two additional tacks. It invoked traditional icons of American–and thus Protestant–
religious freedom, particularly James Madison and Thomas Jefferson,86 and it emphasized that
Christian interests also were at stake in the case. “Jewish groups,” the brief argued, “base their
opposition to the released time program on many grounds, but no consideration bulks larger in
that opposition than the divisive effects of the program. Thoughtful Christians are no less
concerned with this harmful aspect of released time.”87 An “eminent Protestant observer” was
quoted to this effect.88 Moreover, the brief specifically cited to “ample evidence that the
teachings in religious courses foster antagonisms between Christians and Jews, between
Protestants and Catholics and even among various Protestant sects.”89
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“somebody is always going to be ‘hurt.’ Orthodox Jews might lose two days.” In Conference, supra note 18, at
393.
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Brief of Synagogue Council of America and National Community Relations Advisory Council as Amici
Curiae, McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (October Term 1947, No. 90), at 13.
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Id. at 15-16, 29.
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Id. at 2-3.
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Id. at 3 n.3.
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Id. at 4. The brief added that Protestant and Catholic children were not treated equally: “Protestant
religious instruction is conducted in the same classroom in which the regular classes are held, whereas the Catholic
children are required to leave the room and go to a basement room, operates as an obvious preference.” Id. at 16.

Religious Minorities - 26 The second theme evident in the McCollum amicus brief was that the strict separation of
church and state protects and fosters religion. “Our opposition to religious instruction within the
public school must in no way be interpreted as hostility to religious instruction as such.”90 The
brief then stressed the religiosity within the American Jewish community, including the
community’s emphasis on the religious education of Jewish children.91 Indeed, the brief
concluded by expressly linking together the two themes or strategies. Religiosity and its
protection are part and parcel of American democratic principles: “by protecting religion against
the intrusion of civil authority and by making it impossible for the state to become a battleground
for sectarian preference and favor, [the separation of church and state] has preserved both our
political freedom and our religious freedom.”92
One of the difficulties in the case was that the actual establishment clause claimant,
Vashti McCollum, was an avowed atheist. This fact particularly troubled the AJCommittee and
the ADL, which led to the following language in the brief:
We wish to make clear our regret that the appellant chose to use the case as a
medium for the dissemination of her atheistic beliefs and injected into the record
the irreligious statements it contains. We wish not only to disassociate ourselves
completely from the anti-religious views of the appellant, but wish to deplore the
fact that the sponsors of the original petition chose the case as a means of
inscribing such matter on the public record and confusing the basic issues in the
case by dragging into it the unrelated issues of atheism vs. religion.93
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Id. at 5. This theme, that the strict separation of church and state is good for religion, had previously
been pronounced not only by James Madison but also by Roger Williams. Feldman, Please Don’t, supra note 10, at
128-29, 152-53.
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Brief of Synagogue Council of America and National Community Relations Advisory Council as Amici
Curiae, McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (October Term 1947, No. 90), at 5-6.
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Id. at 41.
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Id. at 6; see Ivers, supra note 18, at 79 (discussing the dispute leading to this language).

Religious Minorities - 27 Once again, thus, the amicus brief unequivocally declared that the Jewish organizations
themselves were not atheistic but instead supported religion, and that the separation of church
and state, as a constitutional principle, would foster rather than inhibit religion.
The Supreme Court held that the Champaign released time program was unconstitutional,
with the SCA and NCRAC amicus brief apparently playing a significant role. While the brief’s
influence was most discernible in Justice Felix Frankfurter’s concurrence,94 the majority opinion,
written again by Justice Black, also echoed the brief in multiple ways. The Court’s own
language resonated with the main thrust of the brief’s argument. “This [released time program]
is beyond all question,” the Court wrote, “a utilization of the tax-established and tax-supported
public school system to aid religious groups to spread their faith. And it falls squarely under the
ban of the First Amendment.…”95 Furthermore, the Court stressed that there is an American
tradition or principle of religiosity and that the strict enforcement of the principle of religious
freedom protects and even bolsters such religiosity:
To hold that a state cannot consistently with the First and Fourteenth
Amendments utilize its public school system to aid any or all religious faiths or
sects in the dissemination of their doctrines and ideals does not, as counsel urge,
manifest a governmental hostility to religion or religious teachings. A
manifestation of such hostility would be at war with our national tradition as
embodied in the First Amendment's guaranty of the free exercise of religion. For
the First Amendment rests upon the premise that both religion and government
can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left free from the other within
its respective sphere. Or, as we said in the Everson case, the First Amendment had
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McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 212-28 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see Cohen,
supra note 18, at 143 (discussing Frankfurter’s reliance on the amicus brief).
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McCollum, 333 U.S. at 210.

Religious Minorities - 28 erected a wall between Church and State which must be kept high and
impregnable.96
Perhaps the Court’s strongest statement regarding the ostensible wall of separation
between church and state came more than a decade after McCollum in the context of an
establishment clause case, Engel v. Vitale,97 which challenged prayer in the public schools. The
reading of the Protestant Bible and the recitation of prayers long had been common practices in
public schools across the country.98 In 1951, the Board of Regents of New York State had
recommended that local school boards have children recite a prayer each day in school in order
to promote religious commitment and moral and spiritual values. The Regents recommended the
use of a supposedly “nondenominational” prayer.99 When a town school board adopted this
prayer for use in its classrooms in 1958, several parents decided to challenge the constitutionality
of the practice. The plaintiffs, not yet supported by any of the Jewish organizations, lost in the
state trial court. But by the time the case reached the United States Supreme Court, the
AJCommittee and the ADL already had joined the fray; they together filed an amicus brief with
the Court. The AJCongress’s Leo Pfeffer, who had strong reservations about the case,
eventually also filed an amicus brief with the Court on behalf of the SCA and the NCRAC.100
The Jewish organizations’ amicus briefs reiterated the two interrelated themes that were
central to the McCollum amicus brief. While the AJCommittee and ADL brief in Engel focused
on stare decisis, relying heavily on the Supreme Court’s McCollum opinion, the brief also
carefully explained that the strict separation of church and state benefits religion: “Freedom of
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Id. at 211-12.
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370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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Feldman, Please Don’t, supra note 10, at 191, 208, 223.

99

Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962). The prayer was as follows: “Almighty God, we acknowledge
our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country.” Id. at
422.
100

Cohen, supra note 18, at 168-70.

Religious Minorities - 29 religious belief, observance, and worship can remain inviolate only so long as there is no
intrusion of religious authority in secular affairs or secular authority in religious affairs.”101
Meanwhile, the SCA and NCRAC brief declared that it sought the “application of the principle
of the separation of church and state.”102 Enforcement of that principle by the “[e]xclusion of
communal prayer from the public school curriculum,” the brief explained, “does not manifest a
hostility towards religion.”103 To the contrary, the SCA and NCRAC argued that banning prayer
in the public schools would promote religiosity.104 Moreover, this viewpoint did not merely
reflect Jewish interests and values; many Christians agreed with them.
This brief is submitted on behalf of the coordinating bodies of 70 Jewish
organizations, including the national bodies representing congregations and rabbis
of Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform Judaism. The thousands of rabbis and
congregations who have authorized the submission of this brief can hardly be
characterized as being ‘on the side of those who oppose religion.’ Many Christian
groups and publications have similarly expressed opposition to the Regents’
Prayer.105
The Court decided the Engel case in 1962 by holding that the daily recitation of the
Regents’ prayer in the public schools violated the establishment clause. 106 The Court articulated
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Brief of American Jewish Committee and Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith as Amici Curiae,
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (1961 Term, No. 468), at 3; see id. at 9-14 (argument based on stare decisis).
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Brief of Synagogue Council of America and National Community Relations Advisory Council as Amici
Curiae, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (1961 Term, No. 468), at 7.
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Id.
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The brief stated that it was “committed to the belief that the absolute separation of church and state is
the surest guaranty of religious liberty and has proved of inestimable value both to religion and to the community
generally.” Id. at 3.
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Id. at 26.
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370 U.S. 421 (1962).

Religious Minorities - 30 religious freedom, or the separation of church and state, as a principled protection of democracy
and religion rather than as protecting Jewish or other minority interests.
When the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a
particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities
to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain. But the
purposes underlying the Establishment Clause go much further than that. Its first
and most immediate purpose rested on the belief that a union of government and
religion tends to destroy government and to degrade religion.107
Most tellingly, the Engel Court drew upon Protestant history to help interpret the establishment
clause. The Puritans, the Court elucidated, had fled England for America in the seventeenth
century to avoid following the governmentally imposed Book of Common Prayer of the Church
of England.108 Daily recitation of the New York Regents’ prayer too closely resembled the
official imposition of the English Prayer Book. Finally, the Court explained at length that
banning public school prayers did not “indicate a hostility toward religion or toward prayer.”109
107

Id. at 430-31.

108

Id. at 425-26.

109

Id. at 434. The Court wrote:

It has been argued that to apply the Constitution in such a way as to prohibit state laws respecting
an establishment of religious services in public schools is to indicate a hostility toward religion or
toward prayer. Nothing, or course, could be more wrong. The history of man is inseparable from
the history of religion. And perhaps it is not too much to say that since the beginning of that
history many people have devoutly believed that 'More things are wrought by prayer than this
world dreams of.' It was doubtless largely due to men who believed this that there grew up a
sentiment that caused men to leave the cross-currents of officially established state religions and
religious persecution in Europe and come to this country filled with the hope that they could find a
place in which they could pray when they pleased to the God of their faith in the language they
chose. And there were men of this same faith in the power of prayer who led the fight for
adoption of our Constitution and also for our Bill of Rights with the very guarantees of religious
freedom that forbid the sort of governmental activity which New York has attempted here. These
men knew that the First Amendment, which tried to put an end to governmental control of religion
and of prayer, was not written to destroy either. They knew rather that it was written to quiet welljustified fears which nearly all of them felt arising out of an awareness that governments of the
past had shackled men's tongues to make them speak only the religious thoughts that government
wanted them to speak and to pray only to the God that government wanted them to pray to. It is
neither sacrilegious nor antireligious to say that each separate government in this country should

Religious Minorities - 31 Without doubt, American Jews—a prototypical religious outgroup—have, to some
degree, litigated successfully under the establishment clause. By carefully choosing and arguing
cases, the Jewish organizations fruitfully urged the Court to stretch the scope of the
establishment clause so as to encompass the Jewish positions. The organizations argued that
enforcing the strict separation of church and state was a matter of principle, not merely a matter
of Jewish interests, and that the Jewish organizations favored religiosity. By imposing strict
separationism, the organizations maintained, the first amendment fostered religion.
Putting this in different words, the Jewish organizations’ basic strategy was to assert their
establishment clause claims but without asking for any special treatment. “We’re just like other
Americans,” they seemed to be saying. “We rely on principles, not on our distinctive interests or
values. And don’t forget,” they added, “we are just as religious as other Americans.”
Understood in this way, success in establishment clause cases was due in part to the Jewish
organizations’ ability to advocate for positions that remained reasonably consistent with
mainstream Protestant interests and values. Studies in the art of rhetoric support using this
sensible strategy. As a general matter, an effective advocate “must choose a characterization that
actually resonates with her audience.”110 When addressing an overwhelmingly Protestant
Supreme Court, then, Jewish advocates litigated wisely by characterizing their positions as
consistent with Protestant views. Moreover, it is worth reiterating, insofar as Jewish advocates
played to Protestant interests and values, those interests and values were at this time partly
shaped by Protestant defensive reactions against perceived Catholic political overreaching.

stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning official prayers and leave that purely religious
function to the people themselves and to those the people choose to look to for religious guidance.
Id. at 433-35.
110

Laura E. Little, Characterization and Legal Discourse, 46 J. Legal Educ. 372, 394 (1996); cf., Samuel J.
Levine, Towards a Religious Minority Voice: A Look at Free Exercise Law Through a Religious Minority
Perspective, 5 Wm. & Mary Bill of Rts. J. 153, 164-65 (1996) (arguing that in cases won by the Jehovahs’
Witnesses, the Court tended to emphasize similarities to the mainstream).

Religious Minorities - 32 Despite the wisdom of the two-pronged litigation strategy, it did not lead to unmitigated
success. The Jewish organizations lost cases such as Zorach v. Clauson, a 1952 establishment
clause case that upheld a released time program where the religious instruction occurred off the
public school grounds.111 In another 1952 decision, Doremus v. Board of Education, the Court
rejected a challenge to Bible reading in the public schools by finding that the plaintiffs lacked
standing to sue.112 And more recently, the infamous Lynch v. Donnelly upheld the public
exhibition of a crèche as part of an extensive Christmas display.113
Furthermore, the Jewish organizations sometimes failed not only in the courtroom but
also in the realm of public opinion. The decision in Engel v. Vitale provoked outrage in both the
Protestant and Catholic communities. Local school districts defied the ruling; members of
Congress called for a constitutional amendment overturning the decision; and newspapers
published editorials and letters condemning the Court.114 Indeed, this backlash at least calls into
question my conclusion that the Jewish organizations’ success in establishment clause cases was
partly due to their arguments remaining consistent with Protestant interests and values.
Nonetheless, this conclusion remains relatively easy to sustain with regard to a case like
McCollum, striking down a released time program. Most important, Catholics participated far
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343 U.S. 306 (1952).
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342 U.S. 429 (1952).
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465 U.S. 668 (1984).
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Cohen, supra note 18, at 171-73; Feldman, Please Don’t, supra note 10, at 234; Ivers, supra note 18, at
137. Neal Devins writes:
That there are instances where court opinions seem inconsequential cannot be denied. Supreme
Court decisions limiting religious observance in the public schools … are often disregarded. The
public school cases demand that objecting students bear the fiscal and emotional toll of
challenging school systems that would prefer to heed religious belief ahead of Supreme Court
decisions. This price is quite high and consequently many religious practices remain
unchallenged.
Neal Devins, Judicial Matters, 80 Calif. L. Rev. 1027, 1065 (1992) (reviewing Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow
Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? (1991)).

Religious Minorities - 33 more than Protestants in released time programs.115 Thus, unsurprisingly, Catholic groups most
vehemently criticized the Court’s decision, while Protestant groups divided in their reactions.116
In fact, during the post-World War II era, Protestants often divided on religious freedom issues,
with some favoring a more secular civil society and others favoring a more religious (read:
Protestant) society.117 Regardless, and more broadly, any judicial enforcement of the wall of
separation between church and state would, at least in part, temporarily bolster the Protestant
defense against Catholic power. From an albeit cynical viewpoint, then, the Court’s McCollum
decision can be understood, in part, as an expression of indifference or even hostility by the
Protestant-controlled Court toward the burgeoning Catholic population.
A similar argument can be made with regard to Engel. First, while visible and vocal
Protestant leaders such as Billy Graham openly attacked the Court’s decision, reaction
throughout the Protestant community was actually mixed, with many Protestants strongly
supporting the Court.118 For instance, the executive director of the Baptist Joint Committee on
Public Affairs admitted that “‘he was not disturbed by the elimination of ‘required prayers’ from
schools.’”119 Second, while some public school districts, especially in the South, continued their
prayers, such resistance to the Court’s ruling was nowhere near as prolonged or intense as in
reaction against Brown v. Board of Education.120 Third, and related to the previous point, the
Court’s reliance on Protestant history was significant. Even if many of Protestants

115

See Ivers, supra note 18, at 72 (discussing Leo Pfeffer’s study of released time programs).
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Cohen, supra note 18, at 145-46 (on Protestant and Catholic reactions).
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Cf., Hamburger, supra note 10, at 476-77 (discussing Protestant divisions, especially after the McCollum

decision).
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119
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Cohen, supra note 18, at 172; Ivers, supra note 18, at 141-42; Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 10, at 320-21.
Ivers, supra note 18, at 141 (quoting C. Emanuel Carlson).

347 U.S. 483 (1954). The less intense resistance to the prayer decision may have been partly due to the
ambivalence of Protestants. See Klarman, supra note 17, at 15-16 (discussing resistance to Court’s prohibition on
prayer and Bible reading).

Religious Minorities - 34 contemporaneously opposed the Engel decision, the Court’s opinion underscored that
governmentally imposed public school prayer resonated closely with the Church of England’s
mandated Prayer Book, which the early Puritans had so strongly detested.121 Put in different
words, while the Court’s decision may have departed from some contemporary Protestant
opinion, the decision harmonized with Protestant values and interests, when understood from a
broader historical perspective. Finally, the Jewish organizations may have once again benefited
from the shifting forces of the Protestant and Catholic political constellations. In particular,
during the postwar era, Catholic support for public school religious practices, including prayer,
increased dramatically.122 One reason for this increased Catholic support was that the enhanced
Catholic political power ensured that public school prayers would be less overtly Protestant.
Prayers, in other words, would supposedly be non-denominational. Because of this increased
Catholic support for public school prayers, there is a reasonable likelihood that the Protestantcontrolled Supreme Court would be less protective of the practice than it would have been in
earlier decades.123
Hence, the importance for the Jewish organizations to articulate their establishment
clause claims consistently with Protestant interests and values should not be gainsaid. In fact, in
Abington School District v. Schempp,124 a case decided only one year after Engel, the
organizations used the same two-pronged strategy to successfully challenge Bible reading as well
as the recitation of the Lord’s prayer in public schools. The amicus brief of the AJCommittee
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See Feldman, Please Don’t, supra note 10, at 81-83, 119-24 (discussing the Book of Common Prayer
and Puritanism).
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See Miller, supra note 6, at 277-78 (noting the strong Catholic support for the New York public school

prayer).
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Michael Klarman writes that while the Court’s prohibition of public school prayers and Bible reading
“plainly were contrary to the preferences of a national majority, they were not dramatically countermajoritarian,
which is what they would have been had the Court rendered them a generation earlier.” Klarman, supra note 17, at
16.
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374 U.S. 203 (1963).

Religious Minorities - 35 and ADL emphasized “the principle of separation of church and state as expressed in the First
Amendment.”125 Moreover, the brief added that the Jewish organizations’ constituencies not
only were religious people but that their views regarding religious freedom echoed Christian
views. The brief quoted Paul Hutchinson, one-time editor of the Christian Century, in stating
that “‘the American adoption of the principle of church and state separation has been a godsend
for the churches, Protestant, Roman Catholic and of every sort.’”126 The amicus brief for the
SCA and NCRAC, in relying heavily on stare decisis, argued similarly.127 Enforcement of strict
separationism, the brief stated, “is the surest guaranty of religious liberty and has proved of
inestimable value both to religion and to the community generally.”128 Banning Bible reading
and the Lord’s prayer would “not manifest hostility to religion.”129 Moreover, “many Christian
groups and publications have similarly expressed opposition” to these practices in the public
schools.130
125

Brief of American Jewish Committee and Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith as Amici Curiae,
Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (1962 Term, Nos. 119, 142), at 3.
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Id. at 4 (quoting Paul Hutchinson, The Onward March of Christian Faith, Life Magazine, December 26,
1955, at 43).
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For example, the brief emphasized the Everson wall of separation language and the McCollum holding.
Brief of Synagogue Council of America and National Community Relations Advisory Council as Amici Curiae,
Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (1962 Term, Nos. 119, 142), at 8-11.
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Id. at 4.
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Id. at 35. The brief adds:

[Striking down the state actions here] would not in any way infringe upon the religious liberty of
children or their parents. It would not prevent any child from reading the Bible or reciting any
prayer he wished during public school hours, provided of course he did not thereby intefere with
the regular course and discipline of instruction. Rather than restrict religious liberty, such a
determination would further it, since it would substitute freedom of individual choice for Stateimposed conduct. In American tradition, religion is a matter of individual choice: the First
Amendment was written because the people did not want their religious beliefs and practices to be
established by law or imposed by government. Invalidation of the regulations here challenged
would place the responsibility for religious exercises where it properly belongs–in the home, the
church, the synagogue and on the individual conscience.
Id. at 37.
130

Id. at 36.

Religious Minorities - 36 Apparently in response to the widespread criticisms of the Engel decision from the
previous term, the Schempp amicus briefs tried, if anything, to augment their willingness to
reconcile their positions with the mainstream Protestant views. They struck an even more
accommodationist chord by explicitly acknowledging that religion could be studied as a secular
subject in the public schools. The SCA and NCRAC brief stated:
The complaints in these actions do not demand, nor do the plaintiffs assert, any
right to the complete exclusion of religion or reference to God from the public
schools. Nothing in the Constitution of the United States requires the school
authorities to remove all matter relating to religion from the school curriculum. It
is not contended that, for example, the Bible may not be studied in the public
schools as a work of literature. … Nor is it contended that the influence of
religion and religious institutions upon history may not be studied in the public
schools.131
The Jewish organizations, in other words, stressed that they sought to eradicate sectarian
religious practices but not religion per se from the public schools.
B. Free Exercise Clause Cases
While the Jewish organizations developed and used a moderately effective strategy in the
establishment clause cases, they were not as successful in articulating or implementing a similar
approach in free exercise cases. The most common type of free exercise case is probably the
exemption claim: a member of a religious group—almost always a minority or outgroup—seeks
131

Id. at 19-20. The SCA and NCRAC brief added:

It is constitutional to study the Bible as a work of literature: it is, we contend, unconstitutional to
read it as an act of devotion. If the approach to the Bible or religious music or art is as an
intellectual study, it is proper in the public schools: if the approach is worship or faith, it belongs
in the home, church and synagogue.
Id. at 20. The AJCommittee and ADL brief likewise stated that the Bible could be studied in “such subjects as
literature, art, history and social studies.” Brief of American Jewish Committee and Anti-Defamation League of
B’nai B’rith as Amici Curiae, Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (1962 Term, Nos. 119,
142), at 18.

Religious Minorities - 37 an exemption (or exception) from a generally applicable law that burdens the exercise of her
religion.
Who wins such free exercise cases? As a general matter, most free exercise claimants
lose.132 More specifically, in an empirical study of free exercise cases in the United States
Courts of Appeals, James C. Brent reports that “claimants who belonged to mainstream Catholic
and Protestant sects were more likely to win than were claimants who belonged to other religions
(38.9% vs. 24.5%).”133 In free exercise exemption cases at the Supreme Court level, the
numbers are even more striking: while members of small Christian sects sometimes win and
sometimes lose such free exercise claims, non-Christian religious outsiders never win.134 Brent
helps explain:
132

Brent, supra note 27, at 249-50 (reporting from a study of the Courts of Appeals); Way & Burt, supra
note 27, at 662 (reporting from a study of all reported state and federal decisions from 1946 through 1956 and 1970
through 1980). According to Jesse H. Choper, “[t]he bedrock test of a government's commitment to protecting the
free exercise of religion arises when general government regulations, enacted for secular purposes, conflict with an
individual's religious beliefs.” Choper, supra note 13, at 1713.
133

Brent, supra note 27, at 250-51. For an interesting analysis of free exercise cases involving Jehovah’s
Witnesses, see Mazur, supra note 18, at 28-61. Mazur explains that between 1938 and 1960, the Jehovah’s
Witnesses won a majority of the more than fifty cases that they were involved with in the United States Supreme
Court. Yet, their success arose from those cases where they focused on free speech claims or they combined free
speech with free exercise claims. Id. at 30, 45, 47, 50-51. Mazur concludes that the Jehovah’s Witnesses were
“singularly unsuccessful” in cases involving only free exercise claims. Id. at 54.
134

As I have written elsewhere:

I refrain from categorically asserting that non-Christians never win any free exercise cases because
a few cases are ambiguous enough to render such a bald assertion at least questionable. Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S.
693 (1986); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); United
States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944). Some of these cases involve religions that may or may not
be categorized as Christian, depending on the definition of Christianity. None of the cases,
though, can be reasonably categorized as involving the enforcement of a free exercise exemption
on an otherwise generally applicable law. For example, in Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972), a
non-Christian seemed to win a free exercise case where the government explicitly and overtly
discriminated against the exercise of Buddhism. The Court held that the lower court should not
have dismissed Cruz’s complaint for failure to state a claim when allegations asserted that Cruz
was a Buddhist and “denied a reasonable opportunity of pursuing his faith comparable to the
opportunity afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional religious precepts.” Id. at 322.
Even in that case, I refrain from asserting that Cruz, as a non-Christian, outright won the case
because of its procedural posture. Since the lower court had dismissed for failure to state a claim
without benefit of a trial, the case presented the free exercise violation as a conditional or
hypothetical, the validity of which would therefore depend on the further development of facts at

Religious Minorities - 38 America is a predominantly Christian nation. It therefore is not unreasonable to
suppose that Christians should receive preferential treatment at the hands of the
Court. Christians probably are less likely to find that the exercise of their religion
is burdened by laws in the first place. Because of the majoritarian process,
lawmakers are less likely to adopt laws that place burdens on adherents of
Christianity, the majority religion. If, however, Christians do find themselves in
court defending the exercise of their religion, the judiciary is likely to be receptive
to their claims. Primarily, this is because Christian judges should be more likely
to be sympathetic to the plight of fellow Christians. The religious burden may
appear more “substantial,” or the governmental interests may seem less
“compelling” when they burden Christians than when they burden non-Christians.
Therefore, mainstream Christians should prevail more often than non-Christians
in free exercise cases.135
The majority opinion in Wisconsin v. Yoder, which involved the Old Order Amish,
illustrates the importance of Christianity for a successful free exercise exemption claim.136 The
Amish impressed the Yoder Court with their devotion “to a life in harmony with nature and the
soil, as exemplified by the simple life of the early Christian era that continued in America during
trial. Cruz thus might have an opportunity to present evidence at a trial, but after such a trial, he
might then win or lose. Moreover, in dissent, Justice Rehnquist even suggested that Cruz,
proceeding in forma pauperis, might still have the complaint dismissed as frivolous under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(d). Id. at 328 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). On the importance of Christianity to free
exercise claims, see Mark Tushnet, “Of Church and State and the Supreme Court”: Kurland
Revisited, 1989 S. Ct. Rev. 373, 381.
Stephen M. Feldman, A Christian America and the Separation of Church and State, in Law and Religion: A Critical
Anthology 261, 273-74 n.5 (Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000).
135
Brent, supra note 27, at 248. Frank Way and Barbara J. Burt agree that mainline or mainstream
religions rarely need to litigate free exercise claims. Way & Burt, supra note 27, at 656. They add:
marginal religions, especially sects, are characterized by social insularity, a stress on doctrinal
purity, and the integration of religious prescriptions into life. Each of these factors bears on free
exercise litigation because membership in a marginal group can bring the faithful into conflict
with secular norms, administrative regulations, or statutes.
Id.
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406 U.S. 205 (1972).

Religious Minorities - 39 much of our early national life.”137 The Court seemed especially receptive to the Amish’s claim
for a free exercise exemption from a state compulsory-education law because they were able to
appeal to the justices’ romantic nostalgia for a mythological past–for a simple Christian America.
This national and Christian past was one that most of the justices (as Protestants) could readily
understand; its meaning corresponded with the religious and cultural backgrounds of the justices
themselves. At the post-oral argument conference, Chief Justice Warren Burger commented:
“This is an ancient religion, not a new culture. … Being raised on an Amish farm is equal to or
better than vocational school training.”138 Thus, whereas non-Christian religious outsiders have
difficulty convincing the Court that their religious convictions are sincere and meaningful, the
Yoder majority opinion, written by Burger, quoted the New Testament in reasoning that “the
traditional way of life of the Amish is not merely a matter of personal preference, but one of
deep religious conviction.”139 Because the Amish were Christians, the Court could easily relate
their way of life to Christian society and Christian history. “Whatever their idiosyncrasies as
seen by the majority . . . the Amish community has been a highly successful social unit within
our society, even if apart from the conventional ‘mainstream.’ Its members are productive and
very law-abiding members of society . . . .”140
The Court consequently sympathized with the free exercise exemption claim of the
Amish in Yoder far more than the Court has ever done with the claims of non-Christian
outsiders, whether Jews, Moslems, or otherwise. For example, in O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,
the Court held that prison officials did not need to grant a free exercise exemption from
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Id. at 210.
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In Conference, supra note 18, at 437.
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406 U.S. at 216.
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Id. at 222. The Court explicitly stressed the long history of the Amish (as Christians) as significant to
the decision: “It cannot be overemphasized that we are not dealing with a way of life and mode of education by a
group claiming to have recently discovered some ‘progressive’ or more enlightened process for rearing children for
modern life.” Id. at 235.
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Likewise, in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, the Native
American respondents sought to consume peyote as part of the supervised rituals of the Native
American Church, but the Court held that the state did not need to grant an exception from a
criminal law prohibiting peyote use.142 The Smith Court also stressed a constitutional distinction
between religious beliefs and conduct (or actions)–a distinction that parallels Protestant doctrine.
The free exercise clause, according to the Smith Court, precludes all governmental regulations of
religious beliefs but does not similarly preclude governmental restrictions on conduct–such as
the use of peyote–even if the conduct arises from religious convictions. A governmental
prohibition on particular religiously-motivated conduct would be unconstitutional only if the
government restricted that conduct exactly because of its religious foundation.143
The difficulty for Jews and other non-Christian outsiders in free exercise cases can be
understood best if one recalls the Jewish organizations’ strategy in establishment clause cases.
Their basic approach was to advocate for positions that remained reasonably consistent with
mainstream Protestant interests and values. They argued, in effect, that they were asking for
141

O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987). For a discussion (including analyses of lower court
cases) of the rights of Jewish prisoners to wear beards, yarmulkes, and eat kosher food, see Abraham Abramovsky,
First Amendment Rights of Jewish Prisoners: Kosher Food, Skullcaps, and Beards, 21 Am. J. Crim. L. 241 (1994).
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Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Bowen v. Roy
held that the government did not need to grant a free exercise exemption to a Native American who sought to
prevent the government from using his daughter’s social security number. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
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494 U.S. 872, 877-79 (1990); e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520 (1993) (holding that a city violated the free exercise clause when the city prohibited animal sacrifices for the
very purpose of discriminating against the Santeria religion); see Reynolds v. United States, 198 U.S. 145, 164-67
(1878) (relying on belief/conduct dichotomy to uphold polygamy conviction despite free exercise challenge); Marci
A. Hamilton, The Belief/Conduct Paradigm in the Supreme Court’s Free Exercise Jurisprudence: A Theological
Account of the Failure to Protect Religious Conduct, 54 Ohio St. L.J. 713 (1993) (emphasizing the importance of
the distinction between belief and conduct in the Court’s free exercise cases). The Smith Court wrote:
[A] State would be “prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]” if it sought to ban such acts or
abstentions only when they are engaged in for religious reasons, or only because of the religious
belief that they display. It would doubtless be unconstitutional, for example, to ban the casting of
“statues that are to be used for worship purposes,” or to prohibit bowing down before a golden
calf.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 877-78.
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exemption scenario. In fact, the nature of a free exercise exemption claim forces the claimant to
do the exact opposite. At the outset, the claimant must explain to the Court how her religious
beliefs or practices differ from the mainstream. It is, after all, this difference that creates a free
exercise problem in the first place, since laws of general applicability rarely interfere with
mainstream Protestant or Catholic practices or beliefs. Then, the claimant must ask the Court for
special treatment to accommodate her religious difference.
Unsurprisingly, the Court on multiple occasions has rejected the free exercise claims of
Jewish litigants–litigants who needed to describe their unusual religious practices (unusual, that
is, from a Christian perspective). For example, in Goldman v. Weinberger, an Orthodox Jewish
Air Force officer, Simcha Goldman, sought a free exercise exemption so that he could wear his
yarmulke (skull-cap) despite Air Force regulations.144 Jewish organizations submitted two
amicus briefs, one filed by the ADL and one filed by the AJCongress. As was true in Goldman’s
petitioner’s brief, both amicus briefs explained the practice and importance within Judaism of
wearing a yarmulke. The ADL brief stated that “[a]s an Orthodox Jew, [Goldman] wore at all
times, as he has done throughout his life, a diminutive head-covering known as a ‘yarmulke’ in
fulfillment of a Jewish religious requirement that he keep his head covered at all times.”145 The
brief elaborated:
The religious practice of wearing a yarmulke, a head covering worn by observant
Jews, is of ancient origin. References to the practice appear in the Talmud, an
authoritative compendium of Jewish law completed by approximately 500 C.E.
The practice has been firmly established since the Middle Ages. For example,
Maimonides wrote in his classic 12th century philosophical treatise, The Guide to
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475 U.S. 503 (1986).

Brief of Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith as Amicus Curiae, Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S.
503 (1986) (No. 84-1097), at 3.

Religious Minorities - 42 the Perplexed, that “the great men among our Sages would not uncover their
heads because they believed that God's glory was round them and over them. …”
And Rabbi S. R. Hirsch wrote in his 19th century commentary on the Jewish
Siddur (prayer book), that “[t]he Jew symbolically expresses [submission to God]
by keeping his head covered, and in this subordination to God he finds his own
honor.”146
Because Air Force regulations sometimes prohibited the wearing of a head covering, the
briefs argued that Goldman’s Jewish and therefore unusual practice of wearing a yarmulke
required the granting of a free exercise exemption. Significantly, in struggling to make its
argument, the petitioner’s brief stressed that the case was not a matter of broad principle, or in
the brief’s words, “a broad constitutional declaration of right.”147 Rather, Goldman’s claim
“rests on a careful and particularized appraisal of the personal and nonintrusive nature of the
religious observance at issue.”148 The brief, that is, practically begged the Court to focus on
Goldman’s unique situation, due to his Jewish practices. Finally, the AJCongress brief
underscored Goldman’s dilemma, one faced by most free exercise claimants: “Because
petitioner sincerely holds the religious belief that he must keep his head covered at all times,
strict enforcement of [the Air Force regulations] forces petitioner–or any other Orthodox Jew–to
choose between adhering to his religious beliefs or serving his country in the Air Force. It is ‘a
cruel choice.’”149
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Id. at 3 n.2 (citations omitted); see Brief for the Petitioner, S. Simcha Goldman, Goldman v.
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (No. 84-1097), at 11-12 (explaining the practice of wearing a yarmulke); Brief of
American Jewish Congress on Behalf of Itself, the Synagogue Council of America, and the American Civil Liberties
Union as Amici Curiae, Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (No. 84-1097), at 4-5 (explaining the practice
of wearing a yarmulke).
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Brief for the Petitioner, S. Simcha Goldman, Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (No. 84-

1097), at 7.
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Id.

Brief of American Jewish Congress on Behalf of Itself, the Synagogue Council of America, and the
American Civil Liberties Union as Amici Curiae, Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (No. 84-1097), at 9
(quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 616 (1961) (Stewart, J., dissenting)).

Religious Minorities - 43 The Supreme Court rejected Goldman’s claim. Strikingly, whereas the Yoder Court had
sympathized readily with the Christian religious tenets of the Amish, the Goldman Court
mistakenly characterized the wearing of a yarmulke as a matter of mere “personal preference.”150
But as the amicus briefs had detailed, wearing a yarmulke is not a personal preference or choice
for an Orthodox Jew. It is a centuries-old custom that has attained the status of religious law.
Apparently, the majority of the Goldman justices–and all of the justices at this time were
Christian–were unable (or unwilling) to comprehend the religious significance of this nonChristian practice.151
Two cases decided in 1961 arose from Jewish religious challenges to Sunday closing
laws, from Massachusetts and Pennsylvania respectively. Among other assertions, the cases
involved claims for free exercise exemptions that would have allowed Jewish-owned businesses
to remain open on Sundays.152 The Massachusetts Sunday law included an impressively long list
of exceptions:
[The Sunday law forbids] under penalty of a fine of up to fifty dollars, the keeping
open of shops and the doing of any labor, business or work on Sunday. Works of
necessity and charity are excepted as is the operation of certain public utilities.
There are also exemptions for the retail sale of drugs, the retail sale of tobacco by
certain vendors, the retail sale and making of bread at given hours by certain
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Id. at 508. The Court wrote: “The considered professional judgment of the Air Force is that the
traditional outfitting of personnel in standardized uniforms encourages the subordination of personal preferences and
identities in favor of the overall group mission.” Id. The Amish, it is worth noting, do not always win. See, e.g.,
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
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475 U.S. 503, 508 (1986); see id. at 525 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (discussing the importance of the
yarmulke in Orthodox Judaism); Roy A. Rosenberg, The Concise Guide to Judaism 124-25 (1990) (discussing the
importance of a yarmulke).
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Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market of Massachusetts, Inc., 366 U.S. 617, 622, 630-31 (1961);
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 608-09 (1961). The Court actually decided four cases involving Sunday laws,
though only two involved Jewish religious challenges. The other cases were brought for commercial reasons. Two
Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1961). For a discussion of the cases, see Cohen, supra note 18, at 226-32.

Religious Minorities - 44 dealers, and the retail sale of frozen desserts, confectioneries and fruits by various
listed sellers. The statutes under attack further permit the Sunday sale of live bait
for noncommercial fishing; the sale of meals to be consumed off the premises; the
operation and letting of motor vehicles and the sale of items and emergency
services necessary thereto; the letting of horses, carriages, boats and bicycles;
unpaid work on pleasure boats and about private gardens and grounds if it does
not cause unreasonable noise; the running of trains and boats; the printing, sale
and delivery of newspapers; the operation of bootblacks before 11 a.m., unless
locally prohibited; the wholesale and retail sale of milk, ice and fuel; the
wholesale handling and delivery of fish and perishable foodstuffs; the sale at
wholesale of dressed poultry; the making of butter and cheese; general interstate
truck transportation before 8 a.m. and after 8 p.m. and at all times in cases of
emergency; intrastate truck transportation of petroleum products before 6 a.m. and
after 10 p.m.; the transportation of livestock and farm items for participation in
fairs and sporting events; the sale of fruits and vegetables on the grower’s
premises; the keeping open of public bathhouses; the digging of clams; the icing
and dressing of fish; the sale of works of art at exhibitions; the conducting of
private trade expositions between 1 p.m. and 10 p.m. … Permission is granted by
local option for the Sunday operation after 1 p.m. of amusement parks and beach
resorts, including participation in bowling and games of amusement for which
prizes are awarded.153
Incredibly, the list of exceptions continued on (and on) even further, but there was no exemption
for Orthodox Jews or others whose religious convictions demanded that they observe the
Sabbath on Saturday.
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Gallagher, 366 U.S. at 619-21.
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Somewhat to their surprise, then, the district court struck down the law as violating both religion
clauses. “What Massachusetts has done,” the judge wrote, “is to furnish special protection to the
dominant Christian sects which celebrate Sunday as the Lord’s Day, without furnishing such
protection in their religious observances to those Christian sects and to Orthodox and
Conservative Jews who observe Saturday as the Sabbath, and to the prejudice of the latter
group.”154 Such a sensitive statement sparked optimism among the Jewish organizations.
In arguing the free exercise claims before the Supreme Court, the Jewish claimants’
briefs as well as an amicus brief for the SCA and NCRAC explained, by necessity, the specific
religious practices of the Orthodox Jewish claimants. For instance, the appellants’ brief in the
Pennsylvania case quoted extensively from the Hebrew Bible and Jewish scholars as it devoted
several pages to its explanation of “the cardinal importance of the Sabbath institution to
Orthodox Judaism.”155 Interestingly, the amicus brief first stated, in a similar vein, that “the
appellees in the Crown Kosher case and the appellants in Braunfeld v. Gibbons are Orthodox
Jews who observe the seventh day of the week as their Sabbath and refrain from all secular
business and labor on that day.”156 In the very next paragraph, however, the amicus brief
attempted to invoke the same strategy that had worked effectively in establishment clause cases.
The brief declared that the claimants relied on the principle of religious freedom and that they
were not concerned solely with Jewish interests and values.
[O]ur concern extends beyond the interests of the particular parties to this
litigation. We would be concerned even if Braunfeld and the proprietors of
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Cohen, supra note 18, at 227 (quoting Judge Calvert Magruder).
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Brief for Appellants, Abraham Braunfeld et al., Braunfeld v. Gibbons, aff’d sub nom. Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (1960 Term, No. 67), 10; see Brief of Appellees, Crown Kosher Super Market of
Mass., Inc., et al., Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market of Massachusetts, Inc., 366 U.S. 617 (1961) (1960
Term, No. 11), at 2-3.
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Brief of Synagogue Council of America and National Community Relations Advisory Council as Amici
Curiae, Braunfeld v. Gibbons, aff’d sub nom. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (1960 Term, No. 67), at 4.
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Sabbath. We believe that the principle of religious liberty is impaired if any
person is penalized for adhering to his religious beliefs, or for not adhering to any
religious belief, so long as he neither interferes with the rights of others nor
endangers the public peace or security.157
Regardless of this strategic effort to render the free exercise claim more ecumenical, the
gist of the claimants’ arguments was one of religious difference, as the Pennsylvania appellants’
brief specified. “[T]here is no real relationship between the Jews’ Sabbath and the Christians’
Sunday. While the latter arose out of the former, they are not the same either in conception or in
manner of observance.”158 For that reason, the claimants requested exemptions from the Sunday
laws so that Orthodox Jews could observe their Sabbath without being penalized.159 As the
amicus brief wryly suggested, however, granting an exemption to Orthodox Jews could not
interfere any more with the religious character of Sundays than did professional sporting events,
which the Massachusetts statute expressly allowed.160
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Brief for Appellants, Abraham Braunfeld et al., Braunfeld v. Gibbons, aff’d sub nom. Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (1960 Term, No. 67), at 10; see Brief of Appellees, Crown Kosher Super Market of
Mass., Inc., et al., Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market of Massachusetts, Inc., 366 U.S. 617 (1961) (1960
Term, No. 11), at 13. The appellants’ brief then emphasized the dilemma that most free exercise claimants face:
choosing between following one’s religion or following the law.
The special vice of the statute now before the Court is the choice it puts to the Sabbatarian
businessman: To give up his Sabbath observance and thus his faith or to go out of business or, at
least, suffer serious economic loss. And it is the statute, not appellants’ religion, which is the
cause of this dilemma.
Brief for Appellants, Abraham Braunfeld et al., Braunfeld v. Gibbons, aff’d sub nom. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S.
599 (1961) (1960 Term, No. 67), at 14.
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Brief of Synagogue Council of America and National Community Relations Advisory Council as Amici
Curiae, Braunfeld v. Gibbons, aff’d sub nom. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (1960 Term, No. 67), at 31.
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Id. at 31-32.

Religious Minorities - 47 The Jewish organizations’ optimism, spurred by the lower court’s decision in the
Massachusetts case, went unrequited. During the post-oral argument conference, Chief Justice
Warren indifferently brushed aside potential injuries to religious outsiders: “[S]omebody is
always going to be ‘hurt.’ Orthodox Jews might lose two days.”161 Given such an attitude, the
Court unsurprisingly upheld the Sunday laws in both cases and refused to mandate exemptions
for the Orthodox Jewish claimants.162 A plurality opinion, in the Massachusetts case, reasoned
that Sunday laws merely regulate secular activities. As such, they do not force a “choice [on] the
individual of either abandoning his religious principle or facing criminal prosecution. … because
the statute at bar does not make unlawful any religious practices.”163
In sum, these free exercise cases reveal that Jews and other non-Christian religious
outsiders have not fared well when seeking free exercise exemptions from generally applicable
laws. Even when the Jewish organizations attempted to advocate consistently with the
mainstream Christian interests and values, they were rebuked. Unfortunately, the crux of a free
exercise claimant’s argument is precisely that her religion diverges from the mainstream
Christian views. That divergence from the religious mainstream, then, compels the claimant to
request special recognition or treatment, in the form of a free exercise exemption.164 In effect,
the free exercise claimant asks the Court to create an exception from the mainstream or normal
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Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market of Massachusetts, Inc., 366 U.S. 617 (1961); Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
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Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. at 605.
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A statement from the petitioner’s brief in Goldman underscores that the crux of a free exercise claim is
religious difference:
According to many respected rabbinical authorities, Jewish law requires observant men to keep
their heads covered at all times. The religious obligation may be satisfied by wearing a yarmulke–
a skull-cap that is universally recognizable as a form of religious observance. This case concerns
the constitutional power of government to forbid an individual from observing this religious duty
while he serves as a psychologist at an Air Force hospital.
Brief for the Petitioner, S. Simcha Goldman, Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (No. 84-1097), at 5.

Religious Minorities - 48 understanding of religion and religious freedom, as manifested in the generally applicable laws
as well as in previous Supreme Court decisions. And in all such cases involving non-Christian
outsiders, the Court implicitly concluded that the claimants’ religious freedom already was
protected adequately. These outsiders, according to the Court, neither required nor were entitled
to any further constitutional shelter.
C. Lessons From History
In light of the history of the postwar establishment and free exercise cases, religionclause litigants obviously would be wise to frame their claims, whenever possible, as
establishment rather than free exercise issues.165 Indeed, further analysis suggests a deeper point.
Regardless of what religion-clause provision is invoked, one should avoid constructing
arguments that accentuate differences from the mainstream. The more that a first amendment
claimant stresses her divergence from the mainstream religious views, the less the Supreme
Court is likely to rule in her favor. This point, however troubling, is reinforced by a perhaps
intuitive social psychology insight: that one’s membership in significant social groups greatly
determines values and perceptions. “[I]ngroup favoritism and outgroup hostility are seen as
consequences of the unit formation between self and other ingroup members and the linking of
one’s identity to them.”166 As soon as a non-Christian religion-clause claimant stresses her
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Phillip E. Johnson has recognized that “many significant problems can be categorized so as to fall under
the rule of either the establishment clause or the free exercise clause.” Phillip E. Johnson, Concepts and
Compromise in First Amendment Religious Doctrine, 72 Calif. L. Rev. 817, 821-22 (1984).
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Norman Miller & Marilynn B. Brewer, Categorization Effects on Ingroup and Outgroup Perception, in
Prejudice, Discrimination, and Racism 209, 213 (John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986); see David G.
Myers, Social Psychology 502-04 (2d ed. 1987) (discussing ingroup-outgroup relations). “What is perceived to be
most salient about a minority is its difference and not the content of its arguments. Its arguments are accorded
meaning first in terms of the minority position they occupy, not in terms of what they express.” Geneiviè Paicheler,
The Psychology of Social Influence 151 (Angela St. James-Emler & Nicholas Emler trans., 1988).
Other psychologists argue that a person is more likely to empathize with another who seems similar. Ezra
Stotland et al., Empathy and Birth Order 125 (1971). Still other psychologists argue that people who argue in their
own self-interest are generally deemed less credible. Myers, supra, at 279-80. It would follow, then, that when
religion-clause claimants overtly specify their own unique religious interests, the Supreme Court justices would be
less likely to pay heed.

Religious Minorities - 49 differences from Christianity, she apparently diminishes her likelihood for success before a
Christian dominated Supreme Court.
Of course, in a free exercise case, a claimant would be hard pressed not to emphasize
religious difference, since that difference is precisely the crux of the claim. But in an
establishment clause case, there might be considerable leeway for strategically presenting one’s
position. Lynch v. Donnelly, which involved the public display of a crèche,167 illustrates the dire
consequences that can follow when religious differences are amplified rather than diminished,
even in an establishment clause context. The amicus brief of the ADL and AJCongress provided
the following information regarding the nativity scene vis-à-vis Christians and Jews.
This religiously based depiction of the birth of the Christian Messiah is one of the
most fundamental religious symbols to Christians and Jews. For Christians it
provides basic religious definition–Christians accept the birth of Jesus as the birth
of the Messiah. “The Christian faith … is based on the mystery of the
Incarnation. … The Christian Incarnation means that God was incarnate in the
human person of … Jesus of Nazareth. …” “The most fundamental affirmation of
Christian faith is the belief that Jesus is the Christ. … On this affirmation
everything else in Christian theology is built. To ask about this affirmation is to
ask about the keystone of Christian faith.”
Just as fundamental to Jewish thought is the “non-incarnation of God.”
“The God in whom [Jews] believe, to whom [Jews] are pledged, does not unite
with human substance on earth.” Further, Jews believe in the inseparability of the
coming of the Messiah with the coming of the Messianic Age and, thus, cannot
accept the Christian conception of Jesus as the Messiah.
Emerging from these fundamentally disparate Christian and Jewish beliefs
is a basic difference between these two religions concerning the messianic nature
167

465 U.S. 668 (1984).

Religious Minorities - 50 of Jesus. It has been described by theologians as part of the “ultimate division
between Judaism and Christianity.” This would have remained merely a
theological difference if it were not for the reaction, throughout history, to the
Jewish non-acceptance of the Christian belief in the Messiah. Discreditation of
Jewish beliefs by linking the non-acceptance of Jesus as the Messiah to the
punishment of the wandering of Jews, together with forced conversion of Jews,
were the historic responses to the Judaic non-acceptance of Jesus as the
Messiah.168
This information is interesting, accurate, and important, at least for someone interested in
Jewish-Christian relations. It also manifested a monumental strategic miscalculation. The amici
apparently intended to stress to the Court how the symbolism of the crèche crystallized the
religious division between Christianity and Judaism. The idea that Jesus was born as the
Messiah, as God incarnate, is central to Christianity and denied by Judaism. But this information
did not impress the Court. Despite the amici’s argument, the Court found that the crèche, as
publicly displayed, was secular and therefore constitutional. The implication is disturbingly
clear: emphasizing religious divergence from the mainstream in a religion-clause case, whether
under the establishment or free exercise clause, is unlikely to engender the Court’s empathy. To
the contrary, divergence seems to induce judicial indifference or even hostility.
III. The Future of Religion-Clause Cases
This Part has three Sections. The first examines current Supreme Court doctrine under,
in turn, the establishment clause and the free exercise clause. The second recommends certain
doctrinal innovations designed to benefit religious outsiders. The final Section then relates both
the current doctrine and my doctrinal recommendations to the history detailed in Parts I and II.
A. Current Supreme Court Doctrine
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Brief of Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith and American Jewish Congress as Amici Curiae,
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (No. 82-1256), at 9-10 (citations omitted).

Religious Minorities - 51 In Lemon v. Kurtzman, a 1971 decision, the Court synthesized previous establishment
clause cases into a three-part test: “First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’”169
The Court has since applied the Lemon test many times and, despite criticisms, has never
expressly and fully repudiated it.
Different justices, though, have introduced and applied alternative doctrines. In Lynch v.
Donnelly, decided in 1984, a majority of justices applied the Lemon test to uphold the public
display of a crèche as part of a larger Christmas exhibition. Yet, because of dissatisfaction with
the Lemon test, Justice O’Connor wrote a persuasive concurrence that advocated the adoption of
an endorsement test, consisting of two prongs: first, does the state action create excessive
governmental entanglement with religion, and second, does the state action amount to
governmental endorsement or disapproval of religion.170
Over the next several years, the Court continued to apply the Lemon test, even as
additional justices expressed support for the endorsement test. In County of Allegheny v.
American Civil Liberties Union, decided in 1989, the Court faced constitutional challenges to
two different governmental displays of religious symbols, one including a crèche and one
including a Chanukah menorah. A majority of justices could not agree on any one test or
standard for determining the constitutionality of these displays. The Court’s majority opinion
articulated both the Lemon and the endorsement tests, suggesting that the latter refined the
former.171 Yet, a plurality opinion in the same case fully accepted the endorsement test and
argued further that a majority of justices previously had accepted the test, though never in one
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403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
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465 U.S. 668, 687-88 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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492 U.S. 573, 592-94 (1989).

Religious Minorities - 52 majority opinion.172 Finally, Justice Anthony Kennedy, concurring and dissenting, advocated
that the Court adopt yet a different approach to establishment clause issues. Kennedy’s coercion
test had two parts: first, the “government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in any
religion or its exercise,”173 and second, the government “may not, in the guise of avoiding
hostility or callous indifference, give direct benefits to religion in such a degree that it in fact
‘establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.’”174 In subsequent cases, the
Court has occasionally applied Kennedy’s coercion test without rejecting either of the other
tests.175
In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,176 decided in 2002, the Court appeared to consolidate
these various establishment clause tests with a conservative twist, thus effectively diminishing
first amendment protections for religious outsiders. The Zelman Court upheld a school voucher
program from Cleveland, Ohio, that allowed parents to use public money to help pay for privateschool education, including at religious or sectarian schools. The majority opinion recited only
the first two prongs of the Lemon test, the purpose and effects prongs.177 Justice Breyer’s dissent
stressed the third prong, governmental entanglement with religion, by arguing that the voucher
program would generate “religiously based social conflict” or divisiveness.178 The majority, in a
footnote, dismissed this concern as irrelevant: “We quite rightly have rejected the claim that
some speculative potential for divisiveness bears on the constitutionality of educational aid
172

The plurality argued that the four dissenters in Lynch actually had accepted the endorsement test, as
articulated in O’Connor’s Lynch concurrence. See County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 595-97 (plurality).
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Id. at 659 (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting).
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Id. at 2465.
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Religious Minorities - 53 programs.”179 In fact, Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Zelman maintained that the Court had
previously “folded the entanglement inquiry into the primary effect inquiry.”180
Zelman thus seems to shift the judicial focus to a modified Lemon test, consisting of only
two prongs, purpose and effects. Not insignificantly, then, the two leading proponents of
alternative doctrines, O’Connor and Kennedy, both joined the Zelman majority opinion, which
briefly mentioned endorsement and coercion as if they were mere considerations under the
effects prong.181 Furthermore, and perhaps even more important, the Zelman Court
disemboweled the Lemon effects prong. The very point of an effects prong, it would seem, is to
inquire into the consequences of governmental action, regardless of the government’s intentions
or purposes. In other words, for the effects prong to be meaningful, the Court should ask the
179

Id. at 2472 n.7.
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Id. at 2476 (O’Connor, J., concurring). O’Connor was following an interpretation of Agostini v. Felton,
521 U.S. 203 (1997), set forth in Justice Thomas’s plurality opinion in Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
Thomas wrote:
In Agostini, … we brought some clarity to our case law, by overruling two anomalous precedents
(one in whole, the other in part) and by consolidating some of our previously disparate
considerations under a revised test. Whereas in Lemon we had considered whether a statute (1)
has a secular purpose, (2) has a primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, or (3) creates an
excessive entanglement between government and religion, in Agostini we modified Lemon for
purposes of evaluating aid to schools and examined only the first and second factors. We
acknowledged that our cases discussing excessive entanglement had applied many of the same
considerations as had our cases discussing primary effect, and we therefore recast Lemon's
entanglement inquiry as simply one criterion relevant to determining a statute's effect. We also
acknowledged that our cases had pared somewhat the factors that could justify a finding of
excessive entanglement.
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 807 (2000).
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Zelman, 122 S.Ct. at 2468-69. O’Connor herself refers to endorsement as no more than an alternative
phrasing of the effects prong.
The Court's opinion in these cases focuses on a narrow question related to the Lemon test: how to
apply the primary effects prong in indirect aid cases? Specifically, it clarifies the basic inquiry
when trying to determine whether a program that distributes aid to beneficiaries, rather than
directly to service providers, has the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, or, as I
have put it, of “endors[ing] or disapprov[ing] … religion.”
Id. at 2476 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691-92 (1984) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring)).
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cultural context of the dispute? Given this focus, a crucial method for proving that the primary
effect of a governmental action is to benefit religion would be through statistical evidence. For
instance, the complainants in Zelman argued that although the voucher program appeared neutral
on its face, ninety-six percent of the beneficiaries sent their children to religious schools.182
Tellingly, the Zelman Court discounted such statistical evidence as inconsequential.183 “Our
focus,” the Court wrote, “was on neutrality and the principle of private choice, not on the number
of program beneficiaries attending religious schools.”184
This transformation of establishment clause doctrine seems designed to favor the
religious mainstream to the detriment of religious outsiders. In future cases, the sole genuine
judicial inquiry will be into governmental purpose; the effects prong has been rendered nominal.
Thus, so long as the government does not appear to purposefully or intentionally favor specific
religions or religion in general, the governmental action will be upheld. The fact that the
government’s action might grossly favor mainstream religions is immaterial under Zelman. And
of course, any supposedly neutral governmental program that allows benefits to flow to religious
institutions is likely, in reality, to disproportionately favor mainstream religions for the simple
reason that the overwhelming majority of people belong to those religions (which is largely why
they are called the mainstream). Meanwhile, any governmental action that appears to
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Id. at 2470-71.
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The Court wrote:

The constitutionality of a neutral educational aid program simply does not turn on whether and
why, in a particular area, at a particular time, most private schools are run by religious
organizations, or most recipients choose to use the aid at a religious school. “[Such] an approach
would scarcely provide the certainty that this field stands in need of, nor can we perceive
principled standards by which such statistical evidence might be evaluated.”
Id. at 2470 (quoting Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 401 (1983)). The Zelman Court also disputed the accuracy of
the statistical evidence in that case. Id. at 2470-71.
184

Id. at 2467.
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purposefully benefiting that religion185—because, after all, how else could a legislature funnel
benefits to an outsider religion unless it did so intentionally? Thus, quite rightly, Justice Souter’s
Zelman dissent denounced the majority’s approach as a “verbal formalism,”186 a judicial inquiry
lacking in any real substance; the Zelman doctrine allows the religious mainstream to direct
benefits to itself under the guise of governmental neutrality.
In the area of free exercise, the Court in Sherbert v. Verner, a 1963 decision, articulated a
strict scrutiny test that would remain, at least nominally, the presumptive standard in free
exercise cases for over twenty-five years.187 According to this test, a state could justify a burden
on an individual’s free exercise of religion only by showing that the state action was necessary to
achieve a compelling state interest. While this judicial standard seemed rigorous and favorable
to free exercise claimants, including religious outsiders, it proved otherwise in application. The
Court repeatedly upheld challenged governmental actions by reasoning either that the
government had compelling purposes for its conduct or that strict scrutiny was inappropriate
under the specific circumstances.188 In fact, from 1973 until 1990, the Court concluded that a
governmental action contravened the free exercise clause only three times.189
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Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (striking
down the creation of a school district that benefited Hasidic Jews).
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Id. at 2486 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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See, e.g., O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (reasoning that strict scrutiny was
inappropriate because of need to defer to prison officials); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (reasoning
that strict scrutiny was inappropriate because of the special needs of the military); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S.
252 (1982) (applying strict scrutiny but concluding that the free exercise clause did not require the federal
government to exempt an Old Order Amish employer from collecting and paying Social Security taxes).
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All three cases involved unemployment compensation. Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment
Security, 489 U.S. 829 (1989) (holding unconstitutional the denial of unemployment benefits to a Christian who
refused to work on Sundays but did not belong to established church or sect); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
Commission of Florida, 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (holding unconstitutional the denial of unemployment benefits to a
convert to Seventh-day Adventism); Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, 450
U.S. 707 (1981) (holding unconstitutional the denial of unemployment benefits to a Jehovah’s Witness who refused
to continue to work in a munitions factory because of his religious objections to war).
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decided in 1990, the Court expressly changed the doctrine for evaluating free exercise claims.
The Court abandoned the strict scrutiny test for free exercise challenges to laws of general
applicability, except for cases, like Sherbert, that involved the denial of unemployment
compensation.191 Apart from that narrow situation, though, the Court suggested that the
“political process” should effectively determine the scope of free exercise rights.192
The Smith Court, in other words, moved from the previous free exercise doctrine of
presumptively applying strict scrutiny—at least supposedly showing almost no deference to the
political process—to a doctrine without any meaningful judicial scrutiny of challenged
governmental actions—a standard showing remarkable deference to the legislative process.
Thus, as with the Zelman doctrine under the establishment clause, the Smith doctrine under the
free exercise clause appears to blatantly favor the religious mainstream at the expense of
outsiders. Because of the nature of our majoritarian legislative processes, laws of general
applicability are unlikely to burden mainstream religions. Legislators are likely either to belong
to the mainstream religions or to be fully aware of the their practices and beliefs. Out of
ignorance or indifference, though, legislators are likely sometimes to enact general laws that
incidentally or accidentally burden the exercise of outsider religions. Yet, members of such
religions will be unable to get judicial relief under Smith. Instead, they will be left to beseech
legislatures in the hope of procuring statutory exemptions. To be sure, such legislative
exemptions will sometimes be forthcoming,193 but they will be due to majoritarian tolerance or
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494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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See, e.g., Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment Security, 489 U.S. 829 (1989) (holding
unconstitutional the denial of unemployment benefits to a Christian who refused to work on Sundays but did not
belong to established church or sect).
192
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Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.

In fact, after the Court decided Smith, Congress attempted to reinstate the strict scrutiny test by enacting
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), which the Court in City of Boerne v. Flores promptly struck
down as beyond congressional power. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103-141, Nov. 16, 1993,
107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994)) (reinstating the compelling state interest test
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constitutional right.
B. Recommended Doctrinal Changes
Doctrine can change, as the recent spate of Rehnquist Court innovations in first
amendment jurisprudence illustrates. With the possibility of further change in mind, this Section
recommends a number of doctrinal modifications in the establishment and free exercise areas
that presumably would benefit religious outsiders.
Under the establishment clause, religious minorities would welcome a stronger focus on
the effects of governmental actions, whether under the guise of a reinvigorated Lemon effects
prong or under some other appellation. Legislatures today will only rarely discriminate
purposefully against religious outsiders,194 yet those same legislatures might unwittingly enact
laws that bestow disproportionate benefits on mainstream religions. Such disproportionate
benefits are not diminished even if such a law is neutral on its face. And of course, some clever
legislators can intentionally design laws that are facially neutral but that will have
disproportionate effects. In theory, these duplicitous laws should be struck down under the stillremaining purpose prong from Lemon, but in reality, proving discriminatory legislative purpose
or intent is notoriously difficult.195
for laws of general applicability infringing free exercise rights); City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S.Ct. 2157 (1997)
(striking down Act).
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For one example of such purposeful discrimination, albeit from the free exercise context, see Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
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See generally Village of Arglington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
266-68 (discussing proof of discrimintory purpose in context of equal protection case). It is the rare case, indeed,
where a legislator openly admits to having discriminatory intent. One such establishment clause case was Wallace
v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985). The Court there noted:
The sponsor of the bill that became § 16-1-20.1, Senator Donald Holmes, inserted into the
legislative record—apparently without dissent—a statement indicating that the legislation was an
“effort to return voluntary prayer” to the public schools. Later Senator Holmes confirmed this
purpose before the District Court. In response to the question whether he had any purpose for the
legislation other than returning voluntary prayer to public schools, he stated: “No, I did not have
no other purpose in mind.”
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presents statistical evidence showing that a governmental action confers disproportionate
benefits either on members of one particular religion, mainstream religions as a whole, or
religious believers in general, then the Court should hold the action unconstitutional. Short of
this ideal, the Court at a minimum should create a presumption of unconstitutionality if such
evidence is presented. The government could then overcome this presumption with a showing of
a sufficiently compelling interest. In other words, the Court could resurrect the Lemon effects
prong under the establishment clause as a type of strict scrutiny test: a showing of
disproportionate effects, possibly through statistical evidence, would shift the burden to the
government to justify its action with a compelling reason.
Another possible way to bolster establishment clause protections could be developed
either through the coercion test or the endorsement test (or a reinvigorated Lemon entanglements
prong). Each of these tests or doctrines requires the Court to evaluate whether a governmental
action produces a certain state of affairs—either coercion or endorsement of (or entanglement
with) religion—and thus the application of these doctrines depends partly on the perspective that
the Court adopts. For instance, the coercion test requires the Court to strike down any law that
coerces anyone to support or participate in any religion, but from whose perspective should the
presence or absence of coercion be judged? Should coercion be judged from the perspective of
the reasonable person or observer—a standard that would incorporate the values and interests of
the dominant or mainstream religions—or should coercion be judged from the perspective of the
reasonable religious dissenter or outsider? If the Court were to adopt the view of the reasonable
dissenter or outsider, the Court would be more likely to conclude that coercion was present.
After all, as a matter of definition, the reasonable outsider will not share all the interests and
values of the mainstream; otherwise, she would be an insider rather than an outsider (or
dissenter).
Id. at 56-57.
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perspective in the endorsement test context,196 the current case law provides at least some
support for adopting the reasonable dissenter or outsider perspective. In Lee v. Weisman,
decided in 1992, the Court focused on the issue of coercion: did a public school practice of
having clergy deliver prayers at graduation coerce a student such as Deborah Weisman, who was
Jewish, into participating in a religious exercise?197 In concluding that coercion was present, the
Court emphasized that the graduates were adolescents who might be coerced more easily than
adults. Thus, contrary to Justice Scalia’s dissent, the Lee majority reasoned that coercion might
exist even though the government was not “by force of law and threat of penalty” imposing a
religious orthodoxy or demanding financial support for religion.198 Coercion could be indirect
and could arise from psychological pressure to conform to certain religious practices.199
Moreover, in the Court’s words, a “reasonable dissenter” in the position of Deborah Weisman
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In the context of the endorsement test, a number of justices have expressed a preference for a
“reasonable observer” standard. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S.Ct. 2460, 2468-69 (2002); Good News Club v.
Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98, 119 (2001). In Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515
U.S. 753 (1995), O’Connor and Stevens debated the content of a reasonable observer standard. Justice O’Connor’s
concurrence, joined by Souter and Breyer, stated that “the endorsement test necessarily focuses upon the perception
of a reasonable, informed observer.” Id. at 773 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). This reasonable
observer, O’Connor explained, should be “a personification of a community ideal of reasonable behavior,
determined by the [collective] social judgment.” Id. at 780 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Stevens,
dissenting, agreed that the endorsement test was the appropriate standard and that it should be applied from the
perspective of a reasonable observer. According to Stevens, though, O’Connor’s conception of the reasonable
observer resembled an “ideal human [who] comes off as a well-schooled jurist.” Id. at 800 n.5 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). The reasonable observer, Stevens argued, should be a person “who may not share the particular
religious belief” symbolized in the disputed public display. Id. at 799 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Thus, Stevens’s
reasonable observer might be construed to resemble a reasonable dissenter or outsider.
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505 U.S. 577 (1992).
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Id. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

199

The majority wrote:

The undeniable fact is that the school district’s supervision and control of a high school graduation
ceremony places public pressure, as well as peer pressure, on attending students to stand as a
group or, at least, maintain respectful silence during the Invocation and Benediction. This
pressure, though subtle and indirect, can be as real as any overt compulsion.
Id. at 593; see id. at 593-94 (discussing peer pressure among adolescents).
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approval of [the prayers].”200
Turning to free exercise doctrine, the introduction of a series of presumptions favoring
the claimant would possibly benefit religious outsiders. These presumptions would be designed
to encourage the justices (and other judges), who are typically political and religious insiders, to
sympathize more closely with the plight of outsiders. The need for such presumptions is
paramount. As already discussed, legislatures today rarely discriminate purposefully against
religious outsiders, yet legislatures might occasionally burden the practices or beliefs of religious
outsiders because of ignorance or indifference. If a legislator is unaware of the practices of a
particular minority religion, she might support the enactment of a general law that could have
disastrous consequences for members of that religion. The fact that the legislator might have
harbored no malice at all toward the religion would be little solace to its practitioners. So, for
instance, probably few members of Congress who supported the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children program or the Food Stamp program even contemplated how a statutory requirement
for recipients to supply Social Security numbers might affect or burden religious practices and
beliefs.201 Yet, eventually, a Native American complained that the assignment of a social
security number would rob his daughter of spiritual power.202
Three different presumptions could help account for the likelihood that outsiders will
occasionally confront generally applicable laws that burden their religious practices and beliefs.
First, any claim of religious conviction should be presumed to be sincere, genuine, and most
important, truly religious in nature. This presumption would possibly discourage the Court from
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Id. at 593.
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42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(25); 7 U.S.C. § 2025(e).
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This was the claim made in a free exercise case, Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
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practices are mere personal preferences rather than sincerely religious.203
Second, though closely related to the first presumption, any free exercise claim based on
non-volitional religious practices should be presumed to be as important, from a religious
standpoint, as a claim based on individual choice related to faith or belief. The Court, in the past,
has accepted the religious importance of faith- or belief-based claims (which are central to
Christianity, especially Protestantism), but has failed to recognize the significance of religious
rituals or sacred objects or events.204 Thus, if implemented, this presumption of religious
importance might help the Court recognize the religious significance of claims arising from
outsider religions that differ widely from the mainstream, such as in Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Association.205 In that case, the Court refused to uphold a free exercise
claim even though the governmental actions, building a road and permitting timber harvesting,
would desecrate sacred Indian burial grounds.
A third presumption would relate to the weighing of religious interests against
governmental interests. A free exercise claimant’s religious interests should be presumed to
outweigh all countervailing governmental interests unless the government shows that its interests
are of overriding (or compelling) importance and cannot be satisfied in any other manner. Quite
evidently, this presumption would reinstitute the strict scrutiny or compelling state interest test
that the Court at least claimed to apply for many years in free exercise cases. The reason for
reintroducing this presumption is powerful: the Court might all too easily permit the sacrifice of
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Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 508 (1986) (stating that the wearing of a yarmulke by an
Orthodox Jew was mere personal preference).
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See Marci A. Hamilton, The Belief/Conduct Paradigm in the Supreme Court’s Free Exercise
Jurisprudence: A Theological Account of the Failure to Protect Religious Conduct, 54 Ohio St. L.J. 713 (1993)
(arguing that the Court has protected religious beliefs but not conduct); David C. Williams & Susan H. Williams,
Volitionalism and Religious Liberty, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 769, 811-13, 828-34, 846-47 (1991) (emphasizing the
Court’s protection of volitionalist religions).
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485 U.S. 439 (1988).
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majorities (the religious mainstream). Certainly, one can understand Gallagher v. Crown Kosher
Super Market, the Massachusetts Sunday closing law case, in this vein: the Court refused to
order a free exercise exemption for the Orthodox Jewish claimants even though the state already
statutorily granted a seemingly endless list of exceptions from its closing law.206 If the Court
were to adopt this recommended presumption—and truly implement a strict scrutiny test—then
the justices would be doctrinally directed to give outsiders’ religious interests their due weight
and would be less likely to hand down decisions like Gallagher.
C. The Likelihood and Significance of Doctrinal Change
Doctrine matters. Religious outsiders, for instance, unquestionably benefited when the
Supreme Court incorporated the establishment and free exercise clauses to apply against state
and local governments in the 1940s.207 Before that time, outsiders could not possibly bring first
amendment challenges, with any hope of success, against state or local governments, no matter
how egregious the governmental action (though outsiders could nonetheless invoke state
constitutional provisions in state court actions). Without the doctrine of incorporation, then,
Engel v. Vitale,208 Lee v. Weisman,209 and other cases that extended some degree of protection to
outsiders could not have been decided.
Recognizing the potential for meaningful change, the previous Section offered
recommendations for doctrinal improvements in a sanguine spirit. Yet, given Parts I and II of
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366 U.S. 617 (1961). The Smith case can be understood similarly. That is, as the Smith dissenters
argued, the state’s interest in prohibiting the religious use of peyote as part of its war against drugs did not outweigh
the free exercise claimant’s interest in using peyote as part of the religious rituals of the Native American Church.
Put in different words, the state did not have a compelling enough interest to justify its interference with the
claimant’s free exercise of religion. Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 907 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (incorporating establishment clause); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (incorporating free exercise clause).
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370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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505 U.S. 577 (1992).
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changes be likely to help religious outsiders? The discouraging answer: probably not. Two
reasons lead to this conclusion. First, the Court is unlikely to change religion-clause doctrine in
the recommended manner. Second, even if the Court were to do so, the modified doctrine might
not significantly alter the outcomes of future religion-clause cases.
Why is the Court unlikely to change religion-clause doctrine in the recommended
manner? As a general matter, a yawning abyss stretches today between the Supreme Court and
legal scholars. The Court shows little interest in legal scholarship and, in fact, has occasionally
expressed disdain for legal academics.210 More specific to religion-clause jurisprudence, though,
the historical discussions in Parts I and II of this Article illustrate, if nothing else, that the
justices’ religious orientations influence their decisions in first amendment cases. The successes
and failures of American Jews who litigated before the Court starkly illustrate the impact that
religion has on first amendment cases. So long as the Court remains predominantly Christian, its
decisions and doctrines are likely to favor Christian (if not Protestant) interests and values. In
short, the Rehnquist Court, as constituted, is unlikely to reverse itself in order to structure
religion-clause doctrine to be more favorable to religious outsiders.
To be sure, the Court is more religiously diverse now than it has ever been before. That
diversity might, in theory, prompt the Court to be more receptive to the claims of religious
outsiders. But still, such a liberal turn seems improbable given that seven of the justices’
backgrounds are from mainstream Christian religions, while only two of the justices, Breyer and
Ginsberg, are non-Christian.211 Moreover, to some extent, the religious divisions between
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Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652-53 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 68-69 (1996) (Rehnquist, J., majority opinion); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211,
228 (1995) (Scalia, J., majority opinion). Judge Harry T. Edwards wrote “that judges, administrators, legislators,
and practitioners have little use for much of the scholarship that is now produced by members of the academy.”
Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 Mich. L. Rev.
34, 35 (1992).
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If Clarence Thomas—who was born a Baptist, raised a Catholic, began attending an Episcopal Church,
and then returned to Catholicism—is categorized as Catholic, then 1996 marked the first time that a majority of the
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conservative political bonds. It is commonplace now to acknowledge that conservative Catholics
and fundamentalist Protestants share more in common on certain political and moral issues than
do liberal and conservative Protestants.212 Thus, the majority-block of politically conservative
justices will likely repress any religiously induced inclinations toward the protection of
individual rights, whether under the first amendment or otherwise.213
Indeed, the Court's recent free exercise and establishment clause landmarks suggest the
strength of these political forces working in conjunction with the justices’ mainstream religious
orientations. If anything, the Court currently leans strongly toward favoring the mainstream to
the detriment of religious outsiders. Thus, in Zelman, the Court wrote: “The constitutionality of
a neutral educational aid program simply does not turn on whether and why, in a particular area,
at a particular time, most private schools are run by religious organizations, or most recipients
choose to use the aid at a religious school.”214 The Court, in other words, is not troubled if a
facially neutral law effectively funnels public money to schools owned and operated by
mainstream religions. Even more starkly, the Smith Court reasoned that the religious diversity of
the American people actually threatened potential “anarchy” (as Dave Barry would say, I am not
making this up).215 As such, according to the Court, American diversity not only justified but
even necessitated the transition from a strict scrutiny to a deferential test under free exercise.
justices were not Protestant. Mazur, supra note 18, at 12, 179 n.3; see The Supreme Court Justices: Illustrated
Biographies, 1789-1993, at 530 (Clare Cushman ed., 1993) (detailing Thomas’s religious background).
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John Quist, Book Review, 20 L. & Hist. Rev. 431, 433 (2002) (noting “the common moral ground
between contemporary conservative Catholics and Protestants”); Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 10, at 358-60
(discussing shifting alliances on church and state issues and the shared concerns of conservative Protestants and
Catholics); Suzanna Sherry, Religion and the Public Square: Making Democracy Safe for Religious Minorities, 47
DePaul L. Rev. 499, 516 (1998) (discussing a conservative Catholic and evangelical Protestant “alliance”).
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My list of political conservatives on the Court is not quirky at all. I would include Rehnquist, Scalia,
and Thomas as die-hard political conservatives, with O’Connor and Kennedy close behind.
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Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S.Ct. 2460, 2470 (2002).
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Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990).

Religious Minorities - 65 [I]f “compelling interest” really means what it says (and watering it down here
would subvert its rigor in the other fields where it is applied), many laws will not
meet the test. Any society adopting such a system would be courting anarchy, but
that danger increases in direct proportion to the society’s diversity of religious
beliefs, and its determination to coerce or suppress none of them. Precisely
because “we are a cosmopolitan nation made up of people of almost every
conceivable religious preference,” and precisely because we value and protect that
religious divergence, we cannot afford the luxury of deeming presumptively
invalid, as applied to the religious objector, every regulation of conduct that does
not protect an interest of the highest order.216
In sum, then, the Court is unlikely to alter religion-clause doctrine in the recommended
ways. Moreover, even if the Court surprisingly were to follow the recommended changes, the
modified establishment and free exercise doctrines might not substantially alter the outcomes of
future religion-clause cases. Doctrine matters, but in a sense that is less than most lawyers,
judges, and law professors care to admit. To be precise, doctrine matters, but doctrine must
always be interpreted. Significantly, then, one’s political, cultural (religious), and social
perspectives necessarily orient the interpretive process.217 No more so than any other interpreter,
a Supreme Court justice cannot read first amendment doctrine without being situated in a
particular political, cultural (religious), and social context that affects his or her interpretive
conclusions. This interpretive necessity is, once again, one of the lessons from the history laid
out in Parts I and II.
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Stephen M. Feldman, An Arrow to the Heart: The Love and Death of Postmodern Legal Scholarship, 54
Vand. L. Rev. 2351, 2361 (2001); Stephen M. Feldman, Made For Each Other: The Interdependence of
Deconstruction and Philosophical Hermeneutics, 26 Phil. & Soc. Criticism 51, 54-57 (2000); Stephen M. Feldman,
The Politics of Postmodern Jurisprudence, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 166, 173-84 (1996).
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the decisions. Thus, as Parts I and II demonstrate, the Warren and Burger Courts were not as
liberal in establishment and free exercise areas as is commonly believed—and as is suggested by
those Courts’ doctrinal statements. The strict scrutiny test that was theoretically propitious for
religious minorities and that the Warren and Burger Courts supposedly applied in free exercise
cases for more than twenty-five years did little to help non-Christian outsiders—after all, as
discussed, they lost every case at the Supreme Court level. Meanwhile, in establishment clause
cases, the outcomes turned less on the doctrine that supposedly was being applied than on the
ability of the religious outsiders to articulate their positions as consistent with the religious
mainstream.
Hence, even if the Rehnquist Court were to adopt my recommended doctrines for
establishment and free exercise cases—doctrinal approaches that appear favorable to religious
outsiders—the Court's decisions still would be strongly influenced by the religious (as well as
political) orientations of the justices and by the religious slant of the claimants’ arguments. In
short, when the claimants present their arguments so that their religious beliefs and practices
appear largely consistent with the American mainstream, then they have some reasonable chance
of success. If they instead argue so that their religious beliefs and practices appear exceptional
or contrary to the mainstream, then the probability of success diminishes, practically to nil.
This Section of the Article, so far, has argued as follows: first, the Rehnquist Court is
unlikely to adopt my recommended doctrines under the establishment and free exercise clauses,
despite the merits of the recommendations; and second, even if the Court were to accept these
innovations, the results in subsequent cases would change little. One final and important point
must be added, though. Namely, the Rehnquist Court, despite its purported conservative
doctrinal changes in religion-clause cases, is unlikely to be as conservative—as hostile to
religion-clause claimants—as many progressive scholars and commentators fear.
In fact, the Rehnquist Court's establishment and free exercise decisions are likely, in the
end, to closely resemble those of its predecessor Courts. Without doubt, non-Christian outsiders
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did under the strict scrutiny test. And under the establishment clause, the Zelman doctrine is
unlikely to produce outcomes far different from those that would otherwise be reached by the
same set of justices if they were instead applying the traditional Lemon test, the endorsement
test, or the coercion test. The Zelman approach obviously shares much in common with Lemon,
since Zelman, at least nominally, reiterates the first two Lemon prongs. More important, the
differences among the various establishment clause doctrines are neither momentous enough nor
forceful enough to consistently overcome the justices’ religious and political orientations. In
short, the various competing doctrines are unlikely to engender substantially different case
outcomes.
To illustrate the point, some constitutional scholars have celebrated O’Connor’s
endorsement test vis-à-vis the Lemon test, suggesting that the endorsement test could transform
establishment clause jurisprudence.218 Yet, O’Connor herself has interpreted the endorsement
test to echo Lemon.219 More important, when O’Connor has applied the endorsement test in
specific cases, she has typically agreed with the conclusions of her colleagues who had applied
the traditional Lemon prongs.220 Thus, regardless of the rhetorical distinctions between the
endorsement test and the traditional Lemon test, the doctrinal differences were insufficient to
compel the justices to disparate outcomes. The same will be true under Zelman.
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Arnold H. Loewy, Rethinking Government Neutrality Towards Religion Under the Establishment
Clause: The Untapped Potential of Justice O’Connor’s Insight, 64 N.C. L. Rev. 1049 (1986); Suzanna Sherry,
Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 Va. L. Rev. 543 (1986).
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Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S.Ct. 2460, 2476 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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For instance, in Lynch v. Donnelly, the majority applied the Lemon test, while O’Connor articulated and
applied the endorsement test in a concurrence. O’Connor, though, reached the same conclusion as the majority:
constitutionally approving the public display of a crèche as part of a larger Christmas exhibition. Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). In Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995), the
Court held that a private actor, the Ku Klux Klan, could constitutionally display a large Latin (Christian) cross on
public property. A four-justice plurality, with an opinion written by Scalia, outright rejected the endorsement test.
Id. at 766-67. Yet, O’Connor, writing for Souter and Breyer, applied the endorsement test and reached the same
result as the Scalia plurality, upholding the display of the cross. Id. at 776-77 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment).

Religious Minorities - 68 IV. Conclusion
Partly because of enhanced Catholic political power, as explained in Parts I and II of this
Article, the postwar Protestant-dominated Supreme Court articulated first amendment principles
that could be used as a bulwark against perceived Catholic overreaching. Jews and other nonChristian outsiders became the incidental beneficiaries of these judicial pronouncements. By
invoking these supposedly broad principles rather than idiosyncratic Jewish interests and
values—as well as by emphasizing the importance of the strict separation of church and state for
promoting religiosity—Jewish organizations sometimes successfully urged the Court to stretch
the protections of the establishment clause.221 The Jewish organizations, in other words, found
they needed to present establishment clause arguments that largely corresponded with the
already-in-place mainstream understandings of religion and religious freedom. Unsurprisingly,
then, Jews and other religious outsiders consistently lost before the Supreme Court when, under
the free exercise clause, they sought exceptions to this same mainstream understanding, as
manifested in generally applicable laws and in prior Court decisions.
Thus, when the postwar cases are examined from a political, cultural, and social
perspective rather than from a doctrinal one, they reveal a significant judicial succor for the
religious mainstream and a concomitant aversion toward non-Christian outsiders. The Rehnquist
Court, to a great extent, has maintained these intertwined sentiments—support for the
mainstream and antagonism toward outsiders—and in all likelihood, this Supreme Court pattern
will continue in the future. To be sure, the Rehnquist Court has turned first amendment doctrine
in a seemingly conservative direction, but these changes are unlikely to produce results
substantially different from prior decisions, at least at the level of the Supreme Court.
Ultimately, the Court will continue to vindicate the occasional first amendment claim that
remains consistent with mainstream religious, cultural, and political outlooks. The Court,
221

This conclusion is consistent with with Dahl’s observation that “[i]t follows that within the somewhat
narrow limits set by the basic policy goals of the dominant alliance, the Court can make national policy.” Dahl,
supra note 27, at 293-94.

Religious Minorities - 69 likewise, will continue to repudiate the more radical claims that would require a judicial
departure from mainstream understandings of religion and religious freedom. These are the
lessons from history, and the Court's tinkerings with the establishment and free exercise
doctrines are unlikely to change that reality.

